( 4 ) An accurate topological understanding of the precise coordinates of the rela-
tionship between S (the subject barred by the Other of the signifiers), the object
a,and the Thing paves the way for a proper grasp of Lacan’s concept of sublima-
tion. He famously defines sublimation as the “elevation of an object to the dignity
of the Thing”;^132 such an elevation is what takes place in the fundamental fantasy,
“the form on which the subject’s desire rests.”^133 Hence the object ais here “the
imaginary element of the fantasy”—imaginary in the sense of an unconscious Vor-
stellung^134 —that “is superimposed onto the subject [S] to lure him at the very point
of das Ding.”^135 We should now be able to understand why Lacan says that “the Thing
is essentially the Other thing”:^136 the Thing (la Chose)which is forever lost can be
“refound” only in another thing (autre chose),object a,the sublime object that rep-
resents it (its lack) at the foundations of the unconscious.^137 Given that the subject’s
desire aims at the impossible repetition of what has structurally been subtracted by
the intervention of the law (the always-already lost “union” with the Mother qua
Thing), desire—or, better, its drive—can only partially satisfy itself through sub-
limation. As Di Ciaccia and Recalcati rightly observe: “If the Thing can only be
found by means of a deferment in another thing... this indicates that sublimation
[is] not merely one of the possible destinies of the drive but its ultimate struc-
ture.”^138 In other words, human sexuality alwaysentails sublimation, and sublima-
tion can only be sexual: this is basically why human sexuality differs from animal
sexuality. While the aim of animal instincts can never be changed, sublimation
offers the human drive a satisfaction which is different from its ultimate aim (the
Thing); this is “what reveals the true nature of the Trieb[drive] insofar as it is not
simply instinct, but has a [indirect] relationship with the Thing insofar as it is dis-
tinct from the object.”^139 The same point can further be clarified by referring once
again to the notion of extimacy: the Thing is extimate with respect to the (uncon-
scious of the) subject, it is excludedinside him; in this sense, it cannot coincide with
the aim (Ziel)of the drive but is, rather, “surrounded”^140 and thus “defined” by the
object a—the object of sublimation in Sa—to be understood as the (derivative)
aim of the drive.
Lacan’s approach to the function of sublimation causes him to depart from
Freud on two important issues: first, sublimation should not simply be related to
apparently nonsexual activities such as artistic creation and intellectual work. On
the contrary, from what we have just seen, all these activities are nothing but spe-
cific ways in which the subject as desiring being of language comes to terms with
sexuality as sublimation. “Culture” tout court,as distinct from nature, is, after all,
nothing but the consequence of the loss of the primordial object.^141 Secondly, de-
spite Lacan’s following Freud in considering the (implicitly andexplicitly sexual)
objects of sublimation as objects or activities in which the libido of the drive can
tuis.
(Tuis.)
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