Consciousness

• seCtIon tWo: tHe BRAIn
  probably have noticed and then remembered the light changing to red, and been
  convinced that you were conscious of it. This is also why, when we ask, ‘am I  con-
  scious now?’, the answer is always yes; and why, when we ask, ‘what was I conscious
  of a moment ago?’, there seems to be an easy answer. But since there was no probe
  during your drive that led to speech or memory encoding (only those leading to
  changing gears and pressing pedals), you conclude  – if you should happen to
  reflect on the journey once you get to work – that you were unconscious of the red
  light at the time. The only difference is because of the probes that were applied,
  or not. If the probing is done using language, as it often is, the role of the ‘second
  person’ – of social action and interaction, especially through discourse – becomes
  important in ways we will explore more thoroughly in Chapter 17.
  We can compare this theory with the others in terms of our three crucial ques-
  tions: does it help with the problem of why we have subjective experience at all,
  does it try to explain the difference between conscious and unconscious events,
  and does it posit some kind of theatre? The answer to all three is an obvious, and
  defiant, ‘no’. There is no theatre, no difference between conscious and uncon-
  scious events or processes, and as for subjectivity, multiple drafts theory throws
  out most of the assumptions that we usually make about it.
  If we think that at any time there is a truth about what ‘I’ am sub-
  jectively experiencing now, then we are wrong. This is why Den-
  nett is able to say, ‘But what about the actual phenomenology?
  There is no such thing’ (1991, p. 365). And this in turn may be why
  critics complain that Dennett has not explained consciousness
  but explained it away. Yet, he claims that his theory does deal
  with subjectivity. He describes a rich experience of sitting in his
  rocking chair, watching the sunlight on the trees and listening to
  music. This description, he says, is just one of the many possible
  ways the parallel stream could have been probed. If we ask, ‘but
  what was he actually experiencing at the time?’, there is no right
  answer. If we sit now and ask, ‘what am I conscious of now?’, the
  answer will also depend on how the stream is probed. As inner
  speech is produced so content becomes fixed, and we conclude
  that ‘I’ was watching the white fluffy clouds go by. This is how the
  experience and the experiencer come to be created. This is what
  brains do. This, according to Dennett, is how experience can be
  electrochemical happenings in a brain.
  If you find multiple drafts difficult and worrying, then you are
  probably beginning to understand it. It is difficult to understand
  because doing so means throwing out many of our usual habits
  of thought concerning our own consciousness. If you want to
  give this theory a fair hearing before deciding on its merits, then
  you really need to try to understand it with an open mind, setting
  aside your natural assumptions. This is not easy to do, but does
  get easier with practice. The process may feel like identifying the
  routes your thoughts naturally travel down, and then gently, at
  a critical point, opening up a new path. And remember, if you
  decide, having given it a real try, that the theory doesn’t work,
  you can always go back to the old path.

‘there are no fixed

facts about the stream

of consciousness

independent of

particular probes’

(Dennett, 1991, p. 138)

ACtIVItY 5.1

Cartesian materialism

Almost no one admits to being a Cartesian materialist,

yet the literature about consciousness is full of

theatrical metaphors and phrases implying that things

are ‘in’ or ‘out’ of consciousness. It is worth trying to

sort out what these mean before making up your own

mind about the theatre of consciousness. If you are

doing this as a class exercise, ask each person to find

examples in advance and bring them for discussion.

Theories. For any theory of consciousness ask, ‘Does

this theory use theatre imagery or metaphors? If so,

is it a Cartesian theatre? Is this a form of Cartesian

materialism?’

Tell-tale phrases. Look out for theatre imagery,

or phrases that imply CM, in any area of psychology,

philosophy, or neuroscience. Here are a few examples.

In each case ask whether this imagery is helpful, or a

sign of problems with the theory.

‘There seems to be a presence-chamber in my mind

where full consciousness holds court’ (Galton, 1883,

p. 203)

‘ideas [.. .] pass in rapid succession through the mind’

(James, 1890, pp. 25–26)