- seCtIon FIVe: BoRDeRLAnDs
amount to controlled self-stimulation of the reward system. This begins with a
flood of dopamine, leading to increased noradrenaline and then to endorphins,
each neurotransmitter accounting for the various emotions and sensations of
the first three jhanas. Finally, the opioids fade, leaving the neutral state of the
fourth jhana (Brasington, 2015). Although speculative, these ideas can be and
have been tested. When Brasington meditated inside scanners, the shifts from
each state to the next could be seen with both EEG and fMRI (Hagerty et al.,
2013). In further studies, increased activation of the nucleus accumbens was
found to correspond to the extreme joy of the first jhana, which makes sense
because this is part of the dopamine/opioid reward system. If it turns out
that the jhanas are a naturally occurring sequence of brain-based states, they
might provide an excellent example of Tart’s ‘discrete states of consciousness’
(d-ASC).
A methodological review of meditation research (Thomas and Cohen, 2014) takes
the term d-ASC to imply that we should look not just for correlations between the
phenomenology and the physiology (i.e. the experience and the neural activity),
but for ‘recognizable isomorphism’ between them: ‘Thus, a d-ASC in meditation
would be expressed in a discrete state of brain networks, observable as a change
in the dominant network of functional connectivity between brain regions, from
a defined baseline state’ (p. 5).
Note that although this suggestion might seem similar to the search for the NCCs,
there is an important difference: here the idea is to correlate specific d-ASCs with
specific changes in brain activity, not to search for the correlates of conscious ver-
sus unconscious states or for ‘consciousness itself ’, which may or may not exist. The
hypothesis is also stronger than many, with a higher threshold for what counts as
‘alteration’, and a requirement that we define the state from which the alteration
departs. The authors also urge a multidimensional approach to studying ASCs in
meditation, studying the person (characteristics of the meditator), practice (the
specific meditative style), place (the experimental situation and wider geograph-
ical and cultural context), phenomenology (the meditator’s experiences), and
psychophysiology (including documentation of methods). We return to these
considerations in Chapter 17.
One possibility is that states reached by novice meditators may overlap with
states occurring outside meditation practice (e.g. relaxation), even if they occur
more reliably and last longer, but that advanced meditators may reach states that
are unique to meditative practice (Fell et al., 2010), perhaps because meditating
gradually changes the neural structures of the brain. This is suggested, for exam-
ple, by the combination of increased synchronicity in both low-frequency oscilla-
tions and gamma activity in experienced meditators – gamma activity normally
being reduced in relaxation and sleep.
What it really means to claim ‘uniqueness’ for any experience – let alone a complex
set of experiences found during as wide a set of activities as meditative practice –
remains unclear, although the jhanas may provide more clearly ‘unique’ states
than are found with more general meditation practices. Maybe it makes sense
to hedge our bets slightly and talk about ‘meditation-related states of conscious-
ness’ (Fell et al., 2010) rather than ASCs, to avoid commitment to a strong view of
what is altered relative to what.
‘a d[iscrete]-ASC in
meditation would be
expressed in a discrete
state of brain networks’
(Thomas and Cohen, 2014, p. 5)
‘Zen training means
brain training’
(Austin, 1998, p. 11)