Is HYPnosIs An AsC?
the term ‘hypnosis’ comes from the Greek hyp-
nos, for sleep. nineteenth-century researchers
believed that under hypnosis people fell into
a state of somnambulism, or sleep-walking.
others argued against a special hypnotic state
and attributed all the effects to suggestion and
imagination. this argument turned into the
twentieth-century battle between ‘state theo-
rists’ and ‘non-state theorists’.
Applying tart’s definition, we should eas-
ily accept that hypnosis is an AsC, because
hypnotic subjects often feel that their mental
functioning is radically different from normal.
However, the traditional view of the hypnotic
state carries far more contentious implica-
tions, implying a dissociation between differ-
ent parts of the mind. this idea reappeared in
the 1970s with the neo-dissociationist theory
of American psychologist ernest Hilgard.
Hilgard (1977) argued that an executive ego
normally directs multiple control systems, but in
hypnosis the hypnotist takes over this function, making the sub-
ject feel that his or her actions are involuntary and suggested
hallucinations are real. Against this, non-state theorists argue
that hypnotic subjects are playing a social role to please the
experimenter, using imaginative strategies to comply with sug-
gestions, or simply faking it (spanos, 1991; Wagstaff, 1994).
In support of dissociation, Hilgard discovered the phenom-
enon of the hidden observer. When a hypnotised subject
with her hand in freezing water claimed not to feel pain,
Hilgard suggested he could talk to ‘a hidden part of you’,
whereupon the person (i.e. the hidden part) described the
pain she was feeling. Critics responded by demonstrating
that the hidden observer could be made, by appropriate
suggestions, to feel less pain instead, implying that it was
all just suggestion after all (spanos, 1991).
Crucial experiments compared ‘real’ hypnotised subjects
with controls asked to fake or imagine being hypnotised,
arguing that if controls show the same phenomena as ‘really
hypnotised’ subjects, the idea of a special hypnotic state is
redundant. many experiments have shown no differences,
but there are interesting anomalies. Using ‘trance logic’,MENTAL ILLNESS
The term ASC seems to be vague enough that
it can attributed to almost any identifiable shift
in experience, including fluctuations in ordinary
wakefulness like daydreaming, drowsiness, hyp-
nagogic states, dreaming, and sleep; these would
all be grouped under the heading of ‘sponta-
neously occurring ASCs’ (Vaitl et al., 2005). Then
there are ASCs induced by extreme environmen-
tal conditions like heat and cold, altitude and
microgravity, as well as those induced by starva-
tion or orgasm; these might fall into the catego-
ries of physiologically induced ASCs. Some kinds
of illness are capable of inducing ASCs, including
those that cause sleep deprivation or oxygen
deprivation, fever, or seizures, while psycholog-
ically induced ASCs might range from rhythmic
trance to sensory deprivation to bereavement –
and perhaps hypnosis (see Concept 13.2).
A final case we will consider now is that of men-
tal ill health. This brings some of the problems
with the concept of ASC into sharper focus,
as well as raising questions about personal
identity and responsibility, topics sometimes
covered in the field of philosophical psychopa-
thology (Gennaro, 2017).
The first point to make about mental illness is
that it is never solely mental. All psychological
disorders involve feedback loops between
thought patterns, emotions and moods,
behaviours, and bodily states. This already
makes a neat classification into ‘psycholog-
ically’ and ‘physiologically’ induced ASCs
impossible: where do we classify anorexia, or
self-harm, or anxiety disorders involving repet-
itive obsessive-compulsive activities?
The second thing to note is that one of the fac-
tors which helps sustain mental ill health is the
difference between the nature of experience
while ill and when healthy; this can make it
hard to remember, imagine, or believe in the
reality of a state of consciousness other than
the pathological one, which can reduce the
motivation to seek help or persist in recovery.
In this sense, mental illness seems an obvious
candidate for inducing ASCs. What it is like to be
C
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13.2