Consciousness

(Tuis.) #1

  • seCtIon sIx: seLF AnD otHeR
    beard? What, if anything, would John’s
    body feel about the switch? Would it
    reject ‘you’, or welcome ‘you’? Is there
    anything it’s like to be John’s body
    now, or to be ‘your’ body with John’s
    brain in it?
    If you think that both you and John
    will wake up in the ‘wrong’ body,
    then presumably you think that the
    conscious self depends on the brain
    and not the rest of the body. So in
    another popular thought experiment,
    the Martians scan the brains and then
    swap only the patterns of neural
    information. This time, all your memories and personality traits are swapped over,
    but the brains stay in place. Now who is it who experiences the feel of the hairy
    legs and the beard? You or John? Is the experiencing self tied to the body, the
    brain, the memories, or what?
    Ego and bundle theorists differ fundamentally in their responses to such questions.
    The ego theorist might say ‘of course it will be me’ (or ‘of course it will be John’)
    because the self must be associated with something, whether it is the body, the
    brain, personal memories, personality traits and preferences, or some combination.
    In other words, there has to be a right answer to the question ‘who has woken up?’
    Ego theorists may try to find that answer by investigating the relationships between
    the conscious self and memory, personality, attention, or other brain functions, or
    between the brain and the rest of the body and the environment.
    For the bundle theorist, this is all a waste of time because none of us is a continu-
    ous experiencing self. Yes, the person in the bed might scream and shout and be
    very unhappy and confused, but if you ask ‘is it really me?’, then you reveal your
    own confusion. There can be no answer to this question because there is no such
    thing as the ‘real me’.
    Are you an ego theorist or a bundle theorist? If you are not sure, this next thought
    experiment may help you find out.
    Imagine that you are offered a free return trip, anywhere you want to go, in a
    teletransporter (very much like the Star Trek transporter). All you have to do is
    step inside a special cubicle and press the ‘Go’ button, whereupon every cell of
    your body is scanned and the resulting information stored (though your body is
    destroyed in the process). The information is then sent, at the speed of light, to
    your chosen destination and used to reconstruct an exact replica of you. Although
    this science-fiction idea is meant only as a thought experiment, some people
    believe that something like this may one day be possible (Kurzweil, 1999). We will
    return to this and other possible futures for our selves at the end of the chapter.
    Since your replica’s body and brain are in exactly the same state as yours were
    when scanned, the replica will seem to remember living your life up to the
    moment when you pressed the button. It will behave just like you, look like you,
    have your personality and foibles, and in every other way be just like you. The only
    difference is that this psychological continuity will not have its normal cause, the


FIGURE 16.5 • Reprinted from S. Law (2000),
The philosophy files (London:
Orion), p. 66, with permission.

Free download pdf