Chapter
Sixteen
Egos, bundles, and theories of self
Dennett, D.C. (1991). The reality of selves. Con-
sciousness explained (pp. 412–430). London: Little,
Brown.
Selves as centres of narrative gravity.
Gallagher, S. (Ed.) (2011). The Oxford handbook of
the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher’s introduction (pp. 1–28) summarises the
contributors’ arguments, including on whether the self
is embodied (e.g. chapters by Bermudez, Cassam,
Henry and Thompson, Legrand, Tsakiris) or socially or
narratively constructed (e.g. Schechtman, Hermans,
Gergen); and whether self is minimal (Strawson,
Henry and Thompson, Zahavi), even less than minimal
(Metzinger), or does not exist (Siderits). See especially
Strawson (pp. 253–278) and Schechtman (394–416).
James, W. (1890). The consciousness of self. In W.
James, The principles of psychology (i, pp. 291–401).
London: MacMillan.
James’s chapter on the self is long, but it is worth
reading even a little of it to get a sense of his ideas on
the Thought and the thinker. We especially recommend
pp. 298–301, 329–342, and his own summary on pp.
400–401.
Metzinger, T. (2009). The empathic ego. In T.
Metzinger, The ego tunnel (pp. 163–173). New York:
Basic Books.
Includes a summary of the book’s argument so far, and
material on mirror neurons, the developmental self, and
intersubjectivity.
Parfit, D. (1987). Divided minds and the nature of
persons. In C. Blakemore and S. Greenfield (Eds),
Mindwaves (pp. 19–26). Oxford: Blackwell.
Split brains, egos and bundles, and the power of our
beliefs.