Consciousness

Do We neeD A neW KInD oF

sCIenCe?

the table below is an attempt to lay out
the arguments between those who believe
that we need a fundamentally new kind
of science and those who do not. Dennett
calls them the A team and the B team, but
this is only a shorthand. no one has signed
up to these teams, and in reality there are
far more than two positions to consider. so
don’t take the table too seriously – just use
it as a way to remember the main issues
at stake. You might like to fill in your own
answers, too.

the last row leaves room for uncertainty.
Clearly, the B team believes that first- and
second-person methods are essential, but
it is not equally clear what the A team
thinks, or should think (do they consider
these methods valuable, even if not essen-
tial?). For those who agree with A on all
the other statements, the simplest response is to say that
first- and second-person methods are inessential and so
to ignore them. But another response is possible. even
if you believe that all data are third-person data and
there are no ‘experiences themselves’, you may still think
that private practices such as personal intellectual work,
training in attention and concentration, or meditation and
mindfulness may provide especially valuable third-per-
son data. Perhaps these should not be called ‘first-per-
son methods’, but the name seems appropriate, though
the A team would not want them to be confused with a
‘first-person science’.

C

on

C

e

P

t

17.1

A B Your answer

We need a new kind

of science to study

consciousness

no Yes

First-person data are

reducible to third-

person data

Yes no

third-person methods leave

something out

no Yes

theory of science, there is a role for experiential work

and personal inspiration in the process of generating

hypotheses. Such inspiration has often happened in

science, and this is entirely valid as long as the fruits

of the individual’s work can be publicly tested. There

has also been a long history of the public reporting

of subjective impressions. None of these counts as

first-person science because their data were publicly

shared. But they might be counted as first-person

methods to the extent that they involve systematic

self-observation or self-exploration.

We can now see the difference between arguing for a

first-person science of consciousness and arguing for

first-person methods in a science of consciousness. If

we argue only for first-person methods, we may then

ask whether those methods need to be fundamen-

tally different from the methods used in any other

sciences, such as psychology, biology, or physics, or

whether they are basically the same.

Arguably the distinction is less clear-cut than it seems,

however. A scientist might think that she can start to

meditate and introspect as a self-contained activity for

generating hypotheses, and that her scientific prac-

tice will otherwise remain unchanged. But it is likely

that the whole scientific process which surrounds the

meditation will inevitably be changed, because medi-

tating will change her views on what is worth testing,

how the testing should be carried out, what counts

as relevant evidence, and so on. From this perspec-

tive, it is meaningless to ask precisely how many new

methods you can incorporate before you have a ‘new

science’, because any change in method immediately

changes the science. Nonetheless, the distinction still

helps us assess more precisely what may or may not

need to be different about a science of consciousness.

What appears to give the arguments a special

twist when it comes to studying consciousness, as

opposed to photosynthesis or black holes, is that the

subjectivity is itself the phenomenon we are trying

to explain. Here we meet a familiar argument. If there

really are two separate worlds – the mental and the

material, the inner and outer – then a science of con-

sciousness is different from any other science and

needs special methods for examining these non-ma-

terial phenomena. On the other hand, if dualism is

false and the inner and outer, mental and material

worlds are one, then a science of consciousness need

be no different from any other science.