Consciousness

• seCtIon sIx: seLF AnD otHeR
  attention to experience can lead people to per-
  ceive change occurring but with no apparent
  distinction between past and future (Black-
  more, 2011). This suggests that a search for
  the origins of nowness may be a search for an
  interesting kind of illusion.
  Varela’s ambitions have been taken further
  by a new kind of brain imaging called iGBM
  (intracranial gamma-band mapping), which
  measures gamma-band activity between 40
  and 50 Hz as a general index of neural process-
  ing. It has much greater temporal resolution
  than fMRI, and is precise enough in a single
  trial that the signal-to-noise ratio doesn’t need
  improving by averaging across multiple trials.
  These features make it better for exploring sin-
  gular experiences of individuals. But they also
  demand more precision from those individuals
  if the available resolution is to be useful. Claire
  Petitmengin and Jean-Philippe Lachaux (2013)
  argue that to maximise our chances of inte-
  grating the neural and the experiential, we must attend to the smallest temporal
  unit of experience, changing participants’ focus of attention from what (e.g. what
  they are listening to) to how (how the experience changes over time, how much
  effort is involved, what its effects are, etc.). For them, the study of ‘microdynamics’
  provides access to early and usually invisible stages of our cognitive processes,
  where the distinction between the sensorial modalities, and between the
  ‘subject’ and ‘object’ poles seems to be less rigid than in later stages. We
  hypothesize that these early stages give us a glimpse on the process of
  co-constitution of subject and object, knower and known that is called
  ‘enaction’.
  (p. 5)

To help us understand where neurophenomenology fits into a science of con-

sciousness, Varela (1996) provides a simple diagram with four directions in which

theories of consciousness can go. He positions the best-known thinkers on it, but

excludes quantum theories and dualism, and restricts himself to ‘ “naturalistic

approaches’ ”: those which ‘provide a workable link to current research on cogni-

tive science’ (p. 332). In the north, Varela places functionalist theories, suggesting

that they are the most popular in cognitive science, and that they all rely entirely

on ‘third-person’ data and validation. Opposite them, in the south, are the mys-

terians who claim that the hard problem is insoluble. In the east are the reduc-

tionists, epitomised by the Churchlands, and Crick and Koch, who aim to reduce

experience to neuroscience. Opposite them, to the west, comes phenomenology,

with an area cordoned off for those who believe that a first-person account is

essential, including Varela himself.

This diagram is helpful for thinking about the relationships between different the-

ories, and it also puts a spotlight on the role of first-person approaches in a science

‘I can’t grasp a moment

from which to say that

what has gone before

is past and what is to

come next is future’

(Blackmore, 2011, p. 95)

‘If a bridge is to be built

between the neural and

experiential levels, it

should be done where

the river is shallow,

where descriptions of

mental processes are

fine-grained on both

sides’

(Petitmengin and Lachaux, 2013,
p. 1)

Functionalism

Mysterianism

Phenomenology Reductionism

First-person

accountessential

Bears Dennett

Edelmen

Calvin

Churchland

Jackendoff

Velmans

Varela

Globus

Searle

McGinn Nagel

Crick-Koch

mers

agan

Lekoff-Johns

Consciousness

FIGURE 17.3 • Varela devised this two-
dimensional scheme for
categorising theories of
consciousness. Use it to try to
position as many theories as
you can. Don’t turn the page
until you’ve done it.