Consciousness

(Tuis.) #1

  • seCtIon sIx: seLF AnD otHeR
    Maybe a final part of the complicated jigsaw of different ways of studying con-
    sciousness is that we are scared of what we might find if we abandon the meth-
    ods that are familiar to us. We may well have ‘quite reasonable anxieties about
    whether we might hate what we eventually learned about our own brains and
    mind, and these anxieties promote wishful thinking on all sides’ (Dennett, 2007,
    p. 269). It takes courage to set aside what you think you know, is this is nowhere
    more true than of the experiences that feel so intimately yours. In the final chap-
    ter, we will hear more from people who have trained with great commitment in
    noncommittal self-observation. What do they have to say about what they find?


‘Self-deception may feel


like insight’


(Metzinger, 2009, p. 220)


Dennett, D. C. (2007). Heterophenomenology recon-
sidered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,
6 (1–2), 247–270.

A response to fifteen peer commentaries in the same
special issue on different versions of phenomenology
(and other ways of studying consciousness).

Garrison, K. A., Santoyo, J. F., Davis, J. H.,
Thornhill, T. A., Kerr, C. E., and Brewer, J. A.
(2013). Effortless awareness: Using real-time neuro-
feedback to investigate correlates of posterior cingulate
cortex activity in meditators’ self-report. Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience, 7 , article 440.

Uses grounded theory to analyse self-reports and
derive distinctions between different meditative states
during real-time neurofeedback sessions.

Petitmengin, C., and Lachaux, J.-P. (2013).
Microcognitive science: Bridging experiential and
neuronal microdynamics. Frontiers in Human Neurosci-
ence, 7 , article 617.

Suggests new methods to tackle the problem of different
levels of description between neurophenomenology and
neuroimaging.

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