Consciousness

(Tuis.) #1

That day had dawned – whatever dawn


looked like – and now it was the eleventh


hour. The minute-hand twitched forward


to point to twelve. The clock began to


strike. Even louder it seemed to Mary was


the beating of her own heart, always


prone to palpitations at moments of


strong emotion. She heard the sound of


bolts being drawn on the other side of the


door. She rose from her seat and clasped


her bosom with an involuntary movement


of one gloved hand.


(David Lodge, Thinks.. ., 2001, p. 157; read on in
Thinks... to find out what Lodge imagines happening to
Mary next)

If you think Mary will be surprised, are you forced
to reject materialism and adopt dualism? Chalm-
ers does so, but there have been many objec-
tions to this conclusion, and many other ways
of using the thought experiment. For example,
some have argued that Mary comes to know an
old fact in a new way or from a new viewpoint,
or to connect up old facts in new ways, or that
she learns a new skill rather than a new fact (for
a philosophical overview, see Chalmers, 1996).
This sort of argument allows you to think that
Mary really does experience something surpris-
ing when she comes out – but not because there
are irreducibly subjective facts in the world.


An alternative is to deny that Mary will be sur-
prised. The philosopher Christopher Maloney
(1985) suggests a simple test. Choose a colour
(say a nice shade of pale mauve) and give Mary
a detailed neurophysiological description of the
state associated with seeing that colour. If Mary
really does understand all there is to know about the physical nature of colour
vision, she must be perfectly well able to imagine what seeing that particular shade
of mauve would be like. Then expose her to a range of colour samples and get her to
select the pale mauve she had imagined. Maloney believes that she would pass this
test. Paul Churchland proposes a related test: give Mary a stimulus that produces in
her the relevant state ‘and see whether she can identify it correctly on introspective
grounds alone, as “a spiking frequency of 90 hz: the kind a tomato would cause” ’
(1985, p. 26). He too thinks it likely that Mary might pass the test. Along similar lines,
Dennett argues that this story is not the good thought experiment it appears to be,
but a misleading intuition pump that lulls us into vividly imagining (as Lodge does)
the event of Mary’s release from the room, and encourages us to misunderstand its


ACtIVItY 2.1
Mary the colour scientist

When Mary comes out of the black-and-white room,
will she learn anything new? Will she be surprised at
what colours are like? Or does she already know?
Acting out the story in class should help you decide.
Get two volunteers to act as Mary and make a corner
of the room as black-and-white as possible. You might
give them a white tablecloth, a black book, a grey
toy animal, or a plastic brain. You could dress them in
white lab coats – whatever you have to hand. Ask the
Marys to immerse themselves in the role of a futuristic
colour scientist who knows everything physical a
scientist can learn about the brain, the visual system,
and colour: everything.
Now let the two Marys out in turn to do their
best possible impersonations. ‘Mary-amazed’ acts
completely surprised at what she sees, gasping at
the delightful colours. ‘Mary-know-it-all’ explains
why she is not surprised at all – how she understood
everything in advance. Mary-know-it-all is the far
harder role, so it may be best to choose someone
who is familiar with the arguments. Sue once tried
this at a Tucson conference only to discover afterwards
that the volunteer Mary-know-it-all was Michael
Beaton, inventor of RoboDennett – an unforgettable
performance, especially as he was representing the
argument he disagreed with!
Afterwards, everyone else can ask questions of the
Marys, discuss their answers, and make up their own
minds. Write down your own decision. You may find
that it changes as you learn more about the nature of
consciousness.
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