Anthony Cohen, reflecting on the category of the self, argued that the self
is multiple, containing different identities. For Cohen, individuals have
selves that are complex and contain different aspects of sociality. It
emerges that Cohen’s self/individual is actually like a‘dividual’. What,
then, was the point of setting up the concept of the dividual as opposed to
the idea of the individual instead of in conjunction with it? Probably
because the aim was to take a new twist in theorizing and set a new and
simplified trend on its basis. And this is what happened. Instead of a
balance between individual and relational (or‘dividual’) aspects of beha-
vior, the dividual took over. Ethnographers had stressed individuality too
much. So now they had to talk about dividuals instead. The process
became absurd. From being a new idea, the categorization of people as
dividuals rapidly turned into a dogma, or a naturalized supposition of
ontological truth, rather than a piece of rhetoric, as it in fact became in
its dichotomized form.
Entering this arena with the aim of reintroducing a modicum of bal-
ance, we suggested that what we are dealing with in all our ethnographic
observations is‘relational–individuals’–individuals who are nevertheless
tied in to one another by relationships, which they variously respect,
manipulate, refashion, conform to, and the like. Cultural relativism and
the theoretical cult of difference may lead analysts to deny or forget this
substratum of social life in favor of current orthodoxies and essentializa-
tions; but, to adapt the Latin tag,naturam(orpersonam)expelles furca,
tamen usque recurret(drive out nature (or, the person) with a pitchfork
but it will always come back).
The academic argument was more about personhood as a concept in
indigenous thought than about whether people behaved as individuals or
dividuals (howdoesa dividual behave, in any case?). Personhood became
established as one of the things ethnographers needed to understand, and
personhood represents the actors’ideals of how a life should be con-
ducted. It is a concept of value, or ideology in the broad sense.
Understanding such ideals is a completely valid aim offieldwork; but
when juxtaposed with the debate about individuals versus dividuals, the
outcome can be confused. If we concentrate on the dividual, it is easy
enough to equate this dimension with personhood. However, this is
illusory, because the ideals of personhood may equally recognize values
of individuality.
A common feature of discourse in numbers of the societies or languages
of the Papua New Guinea Highlands is a concept that has as a core part of
4 INDIVIDUALS 43