human learning that arguesfirst that we are disposed to learn factually
based ideas, but second that we somehow have an ability to negate such
ideas and create counter-realities that are then the basis of religion.
Religious ontology negates ordinary ontology, yet the two coexist, it
seems, according to this argument. This is made easier, Boyer suggests,
because once the counterintuitive step is taken, the rest is perfectly intui-
tive and in line with reality. Boyer is then able easily to show cross-cultural
examples of cognitive actions attributing intention, agency, and feeling to
objects held counterintuitively to encapsulate spirit power.
Part of the argument, then, is based on imputed childhood cognition.
What, then, are we to do with the propensity of children (and adults) to
imagine all kinds of things? Boyer’s argument suggests that religious ideas
are counterintuitive. But what if in a different way we could equally say
that they are intuitive or based on varieties of the experience of embodied
human subjects?
Another problem here, if we follow Boyer’s line of argument, is why do
the counterintuitive ideas emerge at all? There seems to be no cognitive
theory that can explain this in itself, other than as an improvised way of
arriving at an explanation of religion in a kind of Neo-Tylorian modality.
Once we emerge into the world of developed institutional practices, we
see how ideas are enveloped in and endowed with legitimacy by institu-
tional structures, and are upheld by communities (“churches” in
Durkheimian terms). Boyer would agree with this point, since he notes
that religion contains moral rules and ideas of identity and sometimes
emotional states, as well as notions about supernatural powers (p. 57).
This in itself points up how modest his cognitivist aim is. The aim is not to
explain religion, but to explain (speculatively) how its hypothesized core
notions came to be entertained. The explanation, however, does not seem
to be based on anything other than the supposition that what is counter-
intuitive is memorable. To supplement this idea, some functionalist sug-
gestions would need to be put in place. Why the need to use these
counterintuitive ideas? The cognitive theory by itself does not offer an
answer to this question.
When we consider, also, how religious ideas are actually transmitted,
the answer lies in the authoritative handing down of knowledge by
respected persons, not in the spontaneous development of ideas in chil-
dren or adults. We can still suppose that in some way people are able
readily to accept such notions and thus we can attribute this tendency to
an evolved predisposition. Indeed this appears quite likely; but if we argue
7 RELIGION AND COGNITION 63