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team at [email protected]Attrition
Repor t
Report on Nellis A-10C collision
IR COMBAT Command
has released the Aircraft
Accident Investigation
Board Report into the collision
of two US Air Force A-10C
Thunderbolt IIs over the Nevada
Test and Training Range (NTTR)
last September 6 – see Attrition,
November 2017, p73. The report
identifies the aircraft involved
as 78-0657 ‘WA’ and 79-0204
‘WA’, both assigned to the 57th
Wing’s 66th Weapons Squadron
at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.
The Accident Board President,
Col Bruce E Munger, found by a
preponderance of the evidence,
the cause of the accident was an
unintentional failure to adhere to
established altitude deconfliction
procedures. Substantially
contributing factors included task
over-saturation, misperception of
changing environment, breakdown
in visual scan and environmental
conditions affecting vision.
The A-10Cs – tail number
79-0204 (Mishap Aircraft 1 [MA1])
and tail number 78-0657 (MA2),
collided at 19.44hrs local time
(L), over Range 65C on NTTR, 55
miles (88km) northwest of Nellis
AFB. Both jets were rendered
uncontrollable and the pilots
(Mishap Pilot 1 [MP1]) and MP2
ejected. They suffered minor
injuries during the ejection and
parachute landing, and were
rapidly located by military search
and rescue forces. Both MA1
and MA2 were destroyed. This
resulted in the loss of $30.6m
in aircraft and an environmental
clean-up cost of $108,000.
The accident occurred during a
night mission conducting close air
support as part of the WeaponsInstructor Course for MP1, with
MP2 as the instructor of record.
The Mishap Flight (MF) planned to
work with multiple participants in
the same area of operations (AO).
Other aircraft in the AO included:
‘Shark 41’ flight, two A-10Cs from
the 75th Fighter Squadron (FS)
and ‘Clydesdale 01’, a CH-47
from the US Army 4th Infantry
Division. The MF and ‘Shark 41’
flight operated in the western
half of the AO. Prior to the
accident, the MF departed Nellis
at 18.46hrs and entered the NTTR
at 18.56hrs. Soon after entering
the NTTR, MP1 made contact
with the Joint Terminal Attack
Controller and began the training
scenario. The portion of the NTTR
utilised by the MF prior to the
accident had elevations ranging
from 4,000 to 6,500ft (1,219-
1,981m) mean sea level (MSL).
MP1 was the flight lead and
briefed 1,000ft (305m) altitude
separation as the method to
procedurally deconflict the
MF within the formation and
from other aircraft. This is in
accordance with USAF guidancefor night operations. MP1 and
MP2 both acknowledged the
correct altimeter setting for
the AO and flew at the correct
altitudes from take-off until
19.28hrs. Although night-vision
goggles (NVGs) were worn and
the MF was clear of clouds,
mission tasks and environmental
conditions did not allow the
use of visual deconfliction
procedures. In particular, the
pilots noted illumination levels
were high, but environmental
conditions negatively impacted
NVG use in some viewing
directions; specifically, light from
the setting sun made it difficult
to distinguish detail when looking
west. As briefed, MP1 directed
an altitude deconfliction plan for
the MF with a 1,000ft buffer zone
between altitude blocks. MP1
directed MA1 would maintain
below 10,000ft (3,048m) MSL
and MA2 would maintain 11,000-
12,000ft (3,352-3,657m) MSL.
As the sortie progressed,
increased radio communications,
co-ordination with other
participants and tasks related toweapons delivery diverted MP1’s
time and attention from effectively
crosschecking aircraft altitude.
MP1 stated he did not hear an
audible notification indicating MA1
had climbed above the directed
altitude and into the buffer zone
established to separate MA1 and
MA2. From 19.28 to 19.43hrs,
MA1 progressively climbed
1,400ft (426m) above the directed
altitude block. MP1 and MP2
were unaware they were flying
co-altitude at approximately
11,400ft (3,474m) MSL. MA1
(heading 200° in a 10° right bank)
and MA2 (heading 300° in a 60°
right bank) collided while making
final preparations to attack a
Range 65C target. The mid-air
collision caused the outermost
10ft (3m) of the left wing, as
well as the left engine and left
vertical stabiliser, to separate
from MA1. Additionally, the
outermost 5ft (1.5m) of the right
wing was separated from MA2.
Following the collision, MP1
observed fire on the left side
of MA1. To counter the rolling
motion, MP1 applied control
inputs, but these were ineffective.
Unable to control the aircraft, MP1
decided to eject. At 19.44hrs,
MA1 transmitted an emergency
radar code signifying ejection
had occurred. Immediately
after collision, MA2 began an
uncommanded descent towards
the northwest. MP2 applied
control inputs that helped counter,
but did not stop the descent.
Because of the continued descent
towards high terrain, MP2 decided
to eject. He made a radio call
of “[callsign] bailing out” and
commanded an ejection.Above: A USAF A-10C assigned to the 66th Weapons Squadron takes off from Nellis AFB, Nevada, on June 14 last year. A report into the collision of two 66th
WPS A-10Cs last September 6 has been released. USAF/Senior Airman Joshua KleinholzAbove: The left vertical stabiliser of A-10C 79-0204 was one of the few
substantial pieces of wreckage found on the ground after the mid-air on
September 6 last year USAFA
90 // AUGUST 2018 #365 http://www.airforcesmonthly.com