We had to nail the timing, or we’d risk hitting
someone else’s airplane or bombs.
“The target run was a sensory overload.
The terrain-following radars gave off an
incessant, blaring ‘fly up’ alarm. On top of
that noise, the radar warning receiver was
sounding a constant ‘new-guy’ audio. This
was to warn us of a new priority radar threat.
The Libyans were turning their search radars
off and on and using their beamed tracking
radars to search for us. Each search
radar cycle or sweep of the target trackers
triggered our radar warning. The end effect
was like a broken record. I would have
switched [off] the audio but was afraid I’d
accidentally punch off something important,
like the intercom or radio.
“As we approached Tripoli, the sky was
filled with tracers and surface-to-air missiles,
but the real threat was of plunging into the
water. With our unreliable altimeter setting
and no radar altimeter, we didn’t know how
high we really were, and at 700mph, it
wouldn’t have taken much of a distraction for
us to smack the waves.
“We arrived at our pull-up point, with
18 seconds to go to the target. Our tactic
was to ‘toss’ the bombs, do a wingover, and
then remain at altitude to laser-guide the
bombs. Just prior to pull-up, I de-selected
the afterburner and reset the wing sweep
to 54°. At the pull-up point, I initiated a 4G
pull, concentrated on centring the steering,
pressed the bomb release button (the
‘pickle’), and letting the armament system
compute when to drop the bombs. I relied
on my training and acted on reflex. Chaff,
pull, pickle, chaff. ‘Bombs gone’. Chaff/flare,
wingover. ‘18 seconds to impact’. Chaff/flare.
‘Ten seconds’. Chaff/flare. ‘Five seconds’.
Chaff/flare. ‘Impact’. Chaff/flare.
“Just after our bombs hit, I saw a large,
napalm-like, explosion across the harbour.
It had to have been Karma 52, the F-111
that was lost on the raid. We couldn’t afford
to dwell on our feelings; there was still too
much flying to do. With the bombs gone,
I swept the wings back and got out of
Dodge as fast as possible without using the
afterburner, since it had proven to be an anti-
aircraft-artillery magnet.”
Following the attacks on the various
targets, the F-111Fs egressed the area. It
was not until they had departed that the EF-
111s left their jamming orbits and headed for
their tankers. They had been the first in and
the last out of the area.
Opinions vary regarding the success or
otherwise of the raid on Libya. Undoubtedly
the Libyans were unprepared for the
attack and the F-111s initially met with little
resistance in terms of anti-aircraft fire and
fighter interception. Indeed, no Libyan jets
were scrambled. However, only three of the
18 targets were hit and although several
Libyan military aircraft were destroyed on the
ground, one of the principal targets, Gaddafi
himself, was not touched. His support for
terrorist operations continued unabated.
Although initial opposition was minimal,
and the raid lasted approximately 12
minutes, one F-111F was downed by anti-
aircraft fire or a missile. Fernando Ribas-
Dominicci and Paul F Lorence of the 495th
TFS, flying 70-2389, crashed into the Gulf of
Sidra and were killed.
The refusal of the French and Spanish
authorities to allow the attacking aircraft to
overfly their territory certainly complicated
mission planning. The flight to the target
area took 14 hours to cover 5,500nm
(10,186km) and would certainly have
contributed to aircrew fatigue and could,
arguably, have influenced the overall
success of the mission.
Although aircrew error was responsible
for some of the targets being missed, the
extremely restrictive rules of engagement,
which stated that no bombs were to be
released unless the aircrew were absolutely
52 Aviation News incorporating Jets July 2018
Deployments to the Red Flag exercises held at Nellis AFB, Nevada, were rare prior to April 1986 and Operation El Dorado Canyon. This picture was
taken less than two months after the attack on Libya and shows a KC-10A escorting a pair of 492nd TFS F-111s as they deployed non-stop to Nellis
to drop inert GBU-12D/B laser-guided bombs before landing. Also visible is an SUU-21 practice bomb dispenser. Jim Rotramel
“Every crew member
I served with at
Lakenheath thought it
was a case of when
we would fight World
War Three, not if.”
A 48th TFW F-111F, serial number 73-0715, on deployment to Taif in Saudi Arabia following Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. USAF Archives
48-53_usaf_f111DC.mfDC.mfDC.indd 52 07/06/2018 11:35