March 2018 FLYPAST 23beyond the 20th Parallel deep
into North Vietnam on October
23, officially ending Linebacker
I. Thanks to the generosity of the
USA, the South Vietnamese Air
Force had become one of the largest
in the world, receiving almost 300
aircraft in three months. A shortage
of pilots and support personnel
prevented the comprehensive
operation of these assets.
In the course of Linebacker I,
the US Navy flew almost 24,000
sorties. A third of these were at
night, while the USAF achieved
almost 18,000 missions over the
north. B-52s dropped 155,500 tons
of bombs.
The USAF lost 134 aircraft: 5
to AAA, 12 to SA-2 SAMs, 27 to
MiGs and the rest to operational
accidents. US Navy losses totalled
45 aircraft: 27 to AAA, 17 to SA-2s
and only one to MiGs. The North
Vietnamese suffered 63 losses taken
out in air-to-air combat during
Linebacker I.
Massive build-up
Linebacker II took place from
December 18^ to 29, 1972. The
Stratofortresses bore the brunt of
the operations, with well-timed,
carefully planned missions against
the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.
These raids were the largest
bomber strikes since World War
Two.
The greatest USAF effort of the
campaign was expended on railroad
yards and complexes. These
targets were hit by 18,000 bombs,
delivered by 484 strike packagesinvolving B-52s and tactical
aircraft. A total of 383 rail cars, 14
steam locomotives and countless
lengths of track were destroyed.
The destruction of rail-related
targets was probably the most
significant achievement of
Linebacker II. It caused complete
disruption and must have had a
very serious psychological impact
on Hanoi’s population.
The B-52Ds were configured to
carry 42 x 750lb Mk.117 bombs
internally and 12 x 500lb Mk.82s
on two wing pylons. This was
less than the maximum D-model
load – 108 of the 500-pounders.
The pylons caused excessive drag,
increasing fuel requirements
by about 12% over the 2,600
mile (4,200km) Guam to Hanoimissions.
Lt Gen Gerald W Johnson,
commander of the Eighth Air
Force from September 1971 to
September 1973, remembered the
build-up. “When the decision was
made in February 1972 to increase
the B-52 effort against North
Vietnam, we were flying 39 sorties
per day, all from U-Tapao.
“The build-up started on
February 10, 1972. We only had
two B-52 bases in Southeast Asia;
U-Tapao in Thailand and Andersen
AFB on Guam. A B-52 base in
the US normally had 15 B-52s,
approximately 15 KC-135s [Boeing
Stratotankers] and about 50 crews.
“No one told me what the
ultimate magnitude of this build-
up would be or the time period of
completion. The fact that it wascompleted in mid-June was truly a
remarkable accomplishment.
“In this four-month period we
accommodated 10,000 additional
personnel at Andersen AFB and
built additional B-52 parking hard
stands equivalent to a runway
10,000ft long and 200ft wide. We
now had 200 B-52s at Andersen
and U-Tapao, plus 348 six-man
crews. We also had 114 KC-135s
on three bases, plus 202 crews.”Missile threat
The biggest threat for the B-52s
was the SA-2 SAMs and the North
Vietnamese seemed to have a
significant supply. Colonel William
McCarthy was leading a group
of B-52s toward their target close
to Hanoi. Once refuelling was
accomplished, they started moving
towards the target from several
directions.
McCarthy said: “As we turned
over the IP [initial point] we
picked up the first SAM signals.
We could see them lift off, but
their guidance seemed erratic. The
SAMs exploded far above us at a
considerable distance from our
formation.”completed in mid-June was truly a
Left
A fully loaded Phantom of
the 49th TFW heading for
the Haiphong area during
Linebacker I in August- NOLAN SCHMIDT
Above
The ‘SJ’ tail code indicates
a 4th TFW Phantom,
supporting Linebacker I
and II. LARRY DAVISLeft
The B-52s were loaded
with 750-pounders in the
bomb bay. JIM WOOD