FlyPast 03.2018

38 FLYPAST March 2018

VIETNAM AC-130

Laotians and God knows who else.

They could control the air force

missions, but they really probably

had no say in any of the others that

were in there.”

Even with ABCCC controlling the

effort, other USAF aircraft routinely

flew through airspace assigned to an

AC-130E. Batie recalled: “We were

going along one night fat, dumb

and happy, going to the next area

to search for some trucks and all of

a sudden the airplane feels like it’s

going to drop out of the sky. And

everybody’s just startled – ‘What the

hell was that?’ It was like you hit an

air pocket.

“All of a sudden the right scanner

operator says: ‘That was an F-4 – I

saw his can beacon and then he

went over us.’ He was climbing

probably off a target or something.”

With so many airborne assets

conducting diverse missions, the

potential for close calls was probably

as much of a concern as the Fan Song

radars tracking them on the ground.

Green blip

The gunships flew at 8,500ft

(2,590m), but would go in 1,000ft

higher if the AAA threat deemed it

necessary. Truck hunting began by

setting up a circular search pattern,

cutting back and forth across the

road.

“Flying parallel to the road didn’t

work for the IR and LLTV because

even at 150 to 180 knots, you’re

moving way too fast. Black Crow only

looked off the left side of the airplane

and you only had a 90° sector that you

could scan, so really some kind of an

orbiting search pattern worked best

for everyone.”

Black Crow ended up being the

primary search tool because it had

the longest range of the three sensors

carried by the AC-130. If a truck

had its engine running and was not

masked by terrain, it was usually

found by the gunship crew. Batie

explained:

“Once the EWO had indications

of a truck – a green blip on his

oscilloscope – he would coordinate

with the other ‘booth’ operators to

slew the LLTV and IR sensors to

where the Black Crow noted activity

to confirm target identification. One

of the sensor operators – usually the

IR – would hold the target while the

others searched for additional trucks

by scanning up and down the road.”

The key was to find the whole

convoy before attacking to ensure

maximum damage to the PAVN’s

logistics effort.

Once a target

convoy was fully

identified, it was

time to prosecute.

The AC-130E used the proven left-

hand orbit tactic pioneered by the

AC-47s. The attack began with one

of the sensor operators tracking and

locking on to a target with pilots

usually preferring the stable guidance

the LLTV provided to the fire control

computer.

The pilot banked and flew at a

constant speed, using cues on his

left cockpit window gunsight to aim

the guns by manoeuvring. The fire

control officer selected the appropriate

weapon by considering its ballistic

characteristics in addition to the target

itself.

Once a truck was hit in the convoy,

the crew would shift fire to the

remaining targets until all had been

engaged. Up to 25 trucks would be

destroyed in a single mission during

Commando Hunt VII.

Though the AC-130Es engaged

most targets with their own weaponry,

aircraft with LGBs could easily

be incorporated if available. Batie

remembered his crew coming across

two PAVN PT-76 light tanks moving

along ‘The Trail’. After their guns had

no apparent effect, the crew called in

a nearby ‘Tropic Moon III’ B-57G,

armed with a 500lb LGB.

Although the B-57 dropped on

the target using the AC-130’s laser

designation, and struck within 30ft

of the lead tank, the convoy kept

Below

Low-Light Level TV

sensor’s position looking

over the shoulder of the

operator.

Above right
An AC-130E on the ramp at
Ubon, Thailand.

Below

An AC-130E with a Kaman

HH-43 Huskie helicopter

at Ubon. KEY COLLECTION