50 The Economist June 4th 2 022
China
Chinese intelligenceImperfect spies
I
n recent yearsWestern officials have
maintained a steady drumbeat of warn-
ings about Chinese spies. In short, the
spooks are getting bolder and better.
Among other things, they’re accused of
hacking into Microsoft’s Exchange email
service, stealing Western defence and
commercial secrets, harassing Chinese
dissidents overseas and bugging the head-
quarters of the African Union (all of which
China denies). Yet, when confronted by
overwhelming evidence that Russia was
about to invade Ukraine, China’s spies ap-
pear to have dropped the ball.
Whatever Vladimir Putin told Xi Jin-
ping when the two presidents met in Bei-
jing on February 4th, China did not seemprepared for Russia’s invasion three weeks
later. One giveaway was its failure to make
plans to evacuate its citizens in Ukraine.
China’s embassy first advised them to stay
at home or fix a Chinese flag “on an obvi-
ous place on your car”. If Chinese officials
had in mind “Wolf Warrior 2”, a nationalis-
tic film in which the hero passes the front-
lines of an African conflict by raising a Chi-nese flag, they were disappointed. China’s
parroting of Russian propaganda has not
made it popular in Ukraine. Two days later
the embassy retracted its advice, warning
citizens: “Don’t show your identity or dis-
play identifying symbols.”
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, Chi-
nese diplomats squirmed as their govern-
ment struggled to formulate a coherent po-
sition. China seemed surprised, too, at Uk-
rainian resistance to Russia and at Western
support for Ukraine. In the days after the
invasion, Chinese officials quizzed foreign
counterparts about the situation on the
ground. Before the war, a foreign diplomat
in Beijing recalls Chinese interlocutors
confessing that they had limited under-
standing of central and eastern Europe, but
were fortunate to have the Russians to ex-
plain it for them.
Of course, other countries failed to an-
ticipate the invasion, too. Perhaps Mr Pu-
tin did forewarn Mr Xi and convince him it
would be done in days. But given China’s
reputed capabilities, its lack of contingen-
cy planning and situational awareness
suggest a serious intelligence failure. The
heartening conclusion for many Western
governments is that China’s spies are not
always as good as advertised.Keeping America busy
China has indeed expanded its espionage
activities and capabilities in recent years,
say intelligence officials. Much of that has
focused on stealing technology in indus-
tries it seeks to dominate, such as robotics,
aerospace and biopharma. Chris Wray, the
director of the fbi, said in January that his
agents open a China-related counter-intel-
ligence case roughly every 12 hours. Chi-
na’s cyber-espionage activities are espe-
cially brazen, outstripping those of all oth-
er countries combined, he said. In 2020-21
China’s cyber-spies “demonstrated a high-
er tolerance for risk” than before, reported
Mandiant, a cyber-security firm.
China has got better at human intelli-
gence, too. Some American officials blame
a Chinese mole—as well as a compromised
communication system—for the jailing or
execution of many ciasources in China be-
tween 2010 and 2012. China’s spies have
moved beyond the ethnic-Chinese sources
they used to rely on, often using stolen da-
ta to identify those with vulnerabilities,
and making approaches via LinkedIn and
other social media. China has also escalat-
ed efforts to secure political influence in
democracies, often by offering funding or
perks to politicians, although that’s usual-
ly done through a Communist Party branch
called the United Front Work Department,
rather than its spy agencies.
Still, when it comes to snooping on for-
eign governments, China’s global interests
have expanded so rapidly in the past threeChina’s spooks are good at hacking and harassing dissidents.
But in other areas they have a lot to learn→Also in this section
51 China in the Pacific
52 The war over sand
53 Chaguan: Xi bans grumbling