The Economist June 4th 2022 China 51decades that its intelligence agencies seem
to have struggled to identify clear priori-
ties for what information to seek and
where. “Even if you pull down every single
piece of data in the Kremlin and Putin’s da-
chas, you still have to sort through it all to
figure out what it is that you actually want
to know about,” says Peter Mattis, a former
ciaanalyst who is now at the Special Com-
petitive Studies Project, an ngoin Virginia.
“If you’re searching through massive data,
your results are only as good as your que-
ries.” China’s focus on defence and com-
mercial tech often comes at the expense of
insight into decision-making in foreign
capitals, say other experts.
Another area where China could im-
prove is analysis, which is hobbled by a po-
litical culture that offers few incentives to
take initiative or challenge orthodoxy. Ju-
nior and mid-ranking Chinese intelligence
officers lack sufficient status to make po-
tentially risky calls when interpreting raw
information. Those are usually made by of-
ficials at the vice-ministerial level or
above. And even they may not pass on as-
sessments that conflict with Mr Xi’s wishes
or worldview. “Rather as with the kgb, the
difficulty has been in telling truth to pow-
er,” says Nigel Inkster, a China specialist
and former deputy chief of Britain’s Secret
Intelligence Service. One consequence is
that Chinese spies, unlike most Western
counterparts, often ask sources for written
analysis that can be passed up the chain
but is ultimately attributable to the source,
not the handler.
A related problem is that Chinese spies,
while targeting high-value assets, have a
tendency to recruit peripheral figures—of-
ten retired foreign officials or academics—
and to do so within China. They don’t do as
well getting at difficult targets, says Nicho-
las Eftimiades, a former American intelli-
gence official. To understand the situation
in Ukraine, “they would need to get some-
one in the Polish government or the Polish
military, or the Ukrainian military, who
could report out what’s going on” in more-
or-less real time, he says.
Running such assets also requires
tradecraft, another long-running Chinese
weakness (though it is now improving). In
a study of 595 documented cases of Chi-
nese espionage, mostly since 2000, Mr Ef-
timiades found that in 218 of them the or-
ganisations and individuals involved used
little or no tradecraft or did not make any
significant attempts to hide their activity.
Last year China suffered an embarrass-
ment when Afghanistan expelled about a
dozen suspected Chinese spies.
Spying on Russia presents China with
particular challenges. Despite some recent
success recruiting Russian sources, China
probably has less insight into the Krem-
lin’s thinking than do Western countries,
which spent decades spying on the Soviets.
China fell out with the Soviets, too, in the
late 1950s, but lacked resources for serious
espionage. Since the end of the cold war
Russia has attracted far more Western in-
vestors than Chinese ones. And Western
countries, unlike China, are home to many
politically connected Russians.
Such obstacles might be reassuring to
some who are worried about China’s rise.
But they also point to a more sobering con-
clusion: Mr Xi appears to be making enor-
mously consequential decisions based on
dodgy intelligence. It is unclear whether
the root cause is the information itself, the
analysis applied or how it is communicat-
ed to China’s leaders. In any case, the out-
come could be deadly miscalculation.Imagine a confrontation over Taiwan,
the democratic island that China claims as
its own—and threatens to recapture by
force. Chinese spies have multiple sources
there, but they skew towards pro-unifica-
tion types, rather than those now in power.
If Mr Xi were to consider military action,
he would need his intelligence agencies to
gauge at what point America might inter-
vene. China’s spies direct many more re-
sources to America than to Russia, and
have better access to people who inform
government decisions there. Even so, they
might struggle to predict American moves
in a crisis. And even if they get it right, the
question remains: would they share a view
that conflicts with Mr Xi’s? China in the PacificTreasured islands
D
uring thesecond world war, some of
the fiercest fighting in the Pacific took
place as the Allies pushed Japanese forces
back in a “leapfrogging” campaign across
the islands that dot the ocean north-east of
Australia. Now America and its allies are
scrambling to defend their hold on the re-
gion against an island-hopping diplomatic
offensive from China that they fear could
lead to a military presence. But China is
facing not just Allied resistance. Many
Pacific-island countries want more done to
address local needs—especially climate ac-
tion—and are wary of being sucked into a
global geopolitical contest.
That contest escalated dramatically in
April when China signed a security pactwith the Solomon Islands. According to a
leaked draft, it would allow Chinese ships
to visit and Chinese security forces to de-
ploy there (if invited). On May 26th China’s
foreign minister, Wang Yi, began an un-
precedented eight-country tour of the re-
gion (see map), seeking other agreements
touching on security. The trip has reaped
some fruit. As well as various economic
deals, Mr Wang inked one in Samoa on
building a police fingerprint-laboratory
and others in Tonga to provide a police lab
and customs-inspection equipment.
But he failed to persuade ten countries
in the Pacific to sign a regional agreement
encompassing trade and security at a virtu-
al summit on May 30th. Mr Wang indicatedChina’s interest in the Pacific islands is growing.
But they have their own interestsWallis &
Futuna
(France)BrisbaneKIRIBATICook Is.
(NZ)
FIJI Niue
(NZ)
French
Polynesia
(France)Tokelau (NZ)TONGATUVALUSAMOANew
Caledonia
(France)PAPUA NEW
GUINEAPAPUA NEW
GUINEAAUSTRALIAINDONESIACHINA
TAIWANVANUATUSOLOMON
IS.PALAUMARSHALL IS.
FEDERATED STATES
OF MICRONESIAGuam (US)*May 26th-June 4th 2022Hawaii (US)Northern
Mariana Is.
(US)NAURU EquatorPACI F I C
OCEANPACIFIC OCEANTIMOR-LESTECountries included in:
Wang Yi’s tour of the Pacific*
Virtual summit