The Economist June 4th 2022 China 53Xi bans grumbling by party elders
T
o grasp thedire state of political debate in modern China,
consider this: there are reformist speeches by Deng Xiaoping,
the late paramount leader, that could easily be banned by censors
today. A good example is Deng’s speech on the benefits of collec-
tive leadership of the Communist Party and Chinese state, deli-
vered in August 1980 as he moved against veterans of the recently
ended Mao era and replaced them with modernisers.
Deng was a party man, not a dissident. A ruthless, battle-hard-
ened revolutionary and nationalist, he backed those reforms that
promised to make one-party rule and the economy work better,
and thus strengthen China. Still, when re-read in 2022, his speech
on the reform of party and state leadership sounds like a cry of dis-
sent. For it is a cogent argument about why it is folly, given China’s
history, to hand too much power to one person.
Later this year President Xi Jinping is expected to secure a third
term as party chief and with it personal authority of a sort last en-
joyed by Chairman Mao Zedong. At preparatory meetings nation-
wide, provincial party bosses are busy declaring fealty to the “two
establishes”: clunking party-speak for establishing Mr Xi as the
core of the party leadership and for establishing Xi Jinping
Thought as China’s guiding ideology. Such Mao-era titles as
“helmsman” are being dusted off. Party newspapers talk of living
through an era whose greatness is signalled by the emergence of
Mr Xi, a man of “outstanding leadership and majestic personality”.
Deng explained four decades ago why such developments are
dangerous. His speech in 1980 drew on fresh memories of the Mao
years, a cruel time of policy blunders and man-made famines, po-
litical purges and a personality cult that only ended with the des-
pot’s death in 1976. It opens with four principles. First, he warned
against excessive concentrations of power. Next, noting the limits
to any one person’s knowledge, experience and energy, Deng
counselled against handing two or more jobs to the same individ-
ual: a bitter joke in a China in which Mr Xi is party boss, military
chief, head of state and chairman of numerous policymaking bo-
dies. Third, Deng called for a clearer distinction between the polit-
ical-oversight role of the party and the technocratic work of the
government: a principle increasingly trampled since 2012, when
Mr Xi took over and reasserted party authority over institutions of
state. Fourth, Deng backed the promotion of younger officials to
prevent succession crises. Mr Xi turns 69 this month and has no
named heirs. For good measure, Deng denounced fawning praise
that implies that “history is made by a few individuals”, a notion
that he called not very Marxist (a fair argument, given Marx’s focus
on the large economic and social trends that shape events).
On one point, Deng seemed to concur with his present-day suc-
cessor, when he warned in 1980 against “factionalism”, recalling
the destructive infighting of the late Mao period. Mr Xi’s first de-
cade as chief has seen ever-stricter party rules against “cliques and
cabals” and the disparaging of leaders’ policies. Discipline has
been reinforced by a years-long anti-corruption campaign. It has
seen millions of party members and officials of all ranks investi-
gated, ostensibly for graft and immorality but with notably harsh
prison sentences for grandees who challenged or criticised Mr Xi.
Last month the party announced, in effect, a ban on grumbling,
with retired senior members forbidden to make “negative politi-
cal speeches” or comment publicly on important policies.
Mr Xi’s silencing of dissent is more ambitious than anything
his predecessors attempted. For decades after Mao’s death, party
chiefs hailed the wisdom offered by “collective leadership” while
denouncing “factionalism”. But in fact they knew, and tacitly ac-
cepted, that these are two aspects of the same phenomenon, ar-
gues Olivia Cheung of the University of London’s School of Orien-
tal and African Studies, author of an elegant new research paper:
“Factional model-making in China: party elites’ open political
contention in the policy process”. The paper sets out how national
leaders governed by balancing rival factions. In turn, norms
emerged that allowed elders to show disdain for mainstream party
policies without crossing a line into open revolt. By way of a case
study, the paper describes a procession of party elders, retired
generals and Mao family members who between 1990 and Mr Xi’s
elevation as leader visited Nanjie, a village in the central province
of Henan that rejected land reforms to become a collective again.
Their visits indicated disquiet over the party’s embrace of capital-
ism and were welcomed by Nanjie’s politically savvy leaders. Now,
bowing to the times, the village calls itself part of Mr Xi’s nation-
wide campaign of rural-poverty alleviation, even if it is still fes-
tooned with posters of Mao, Stalin, Lenin and Marx. Factional sig-
nalling by leftists and others was annoying to previous leaders,
but had its uses. Mr Xi’s ban on grumbling is really a ban on infor-
mal ways in which elders talked to one another, says Ms Cheung.
Without informality, the party risks becoming an echo chamber.Where are the safety valves?
Chinese politics is often simplified into a saga of a few clashing
personalities. That misses the extent to which Mr Xi presides over
a sprawling political machine, powered by competing interest
groups. He has dismantled safety valves that allow that machine
to vent internal pressures, says Jude Blanchette of the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington.
Such pressures have not gone away: Mr Blanchette is intrigued to
see Deng’s speech from 1980 being posted on Chinese social me-
dia. That is not evidence that Mr Xi faces a coup, despite recent
speculation about rifts at the top. It is a reminder that he is not
guaranteed a successful third term, not least because unhappy
Chinese bureaucrats are masters at foot-dragging. Understanding
such dangers, Deng in 1980 declared: “No leading cadre should
hold any office indefinitely” (before retaining supreme power for
himself ). It would be a brave elder who quoted his words today. Chaguan
Party factions were annoying to China’s past leaders, but offered a safe outlet for dissent