56 The New York ReviewHealth Care Under Fire
Annie Sparrow
Perilous Medicine:
The Struggle to Protect Health Care
from the Violence of War
by Leonard Rubenstein.
Columbia University Press,
372 pp., $35.00Necessary Risks:
Professional Humanitarianism and
Violence Against Aid Workers
by Abby Stoddard.
Palgrave Macmillan,
175 pp., $89.99There is a new medical specialty in
Syria. Driven by deliberate attacks on
doctors, other medical personnel, aid
workers, hospitals, and ambulances,
this multidisciplinary field covers mass
casualties and severe malnutrition
caused by indiscriminate bombard-
ment and blockades of humanitarian
aid. Lack of electricity means that op-
erations are often done by the light of
an iPhone. Without routine lab tests,
pathology services, or imaging beyond
X- rays, diagnosis is challenging. Clini-
cal resources—fluids, antibiotics, insu-
lin—are scarce. Without blood banks,
transfusions must come directly from
donors, often the medical personnel
themselves. Triage is redefined as a
process of determining not when but
whether patients are treated—a calcu-
lation of their odds of survival against
the use of finite resources. This is siege
medicine.
Since the Syrian government’s bru-
tal repression began in 2011, hundreds
of physicians have been murdered.
Security forces have “disappeared”
hundreds more. By 2015, some 15,000
physicians had fled or emigrated. In
areas besieged by the government,
remaining doctors must practice far
outside their original fields. Pediatri-
cians double as emergency physicians,
general surgeons do vascular surgery,
and dentists handle anesthesia. Under
the expedited system of “see one,
do one, teach one,” specialists learn
from one another, medical residentsrapidly develop broad skills, and even
students perform amputations. Those
who survive the training end up with
expertise in war trauma, competence
in managing antimicrobial resistance,
and familiarity with infectious diseases
previously relegated to history books.
In late December 2017 doctors in
besieged Eastern Ghouta, a semirural
area of 400,000 people ten miles north-
east of Damascus, facing mounting
child casualties and intolerable life-
and- death decisions, issued an urgent
appeal to the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO). The head of emergencies
withheld the letter from the director-
general and did not respond. A second
letter, to the United Nations secretary-
general, also went unanswered. By
April 2018 Russian air strikes had de-
stroyed Ghouta’s last hospitals and Syr-
ian troops overran the area, displacing
hundreds of thousands, including the
surviving doctors.
Systematic attacks on hospitals am-
plify the harm of war and increase suf-
fering. The effects reverberate widely,
spreading terror and driving people to
flee. This exemplifies the weaponiza-
tion of health care—the use of people’s
need for health care against them at a
moment when that need is particularly
acute. This military strategy isn’t lim-
ited to Syria—health care has been
heavily targeted in conflicts in Ethiopia
and Myanmar. Russian forces invading
Ukraine are doing it, too.Attacks on medical personnel have
been forbidden since at least 1864,
when governments adopted the first
Geneva Convention. Since then, inter-
national humanitarian law (IHL) has
expanded to protect civilians in conflict
zones and to uphold the right to receive
humanitarian aid. Because attacking
health care flouts the core purpose of
IHL—to relieve suffering—it has be-
come a sign of broader atrocities.
The growing phenomenon of delib-
erate attacks on medical workers andhospitals is the subject of Leonard
Rubenstein’s Perilous Medicine: The
S t r uggl e to P rot e c t He a l t h C a re f ro m t h e
Violence of War. Rubenstein, a human
rights lawyer and professor at the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health, traces the evolution of interna-
tional standards protecting health care
and examines assaults on them.
He begins with the origins of the
Red Cross. In 1859 Henri Dunant, a
Swiss banker, traveled to Castiglione
in northern Italy, hoping to meet with
Napoleon III, who was commanding
Franco- Sardinian troops in the Italian
war of independence against Austria.
Dunant, who desperately needed Na-
poleon’s help with a business problem,
arrived on the day of one of the blood-
iest battles of the nineteenth century.
When troops clashed in nearby Sol-
ferino in the early hours of June 24, bad
p l a n n i n g m e a n t t h e y w e r e f o r c e d t o fi g h t
without food, water, or field hospitals.
For fifteen hours, a quarter of a mil-
lion soldiers slaughtered one another
across a front line several miles long.
By evening, Solferino was carpeted
with tens of thousands of corpses and
injured combatants from both sides.
Defeated, the Austrians withdrew,
leaving thousands of their wounded
to die on the battlefield. Thousands of
injured French and Italian combatants
were lying alongside them, their misery
exacerbated by thirst, hunger, and flies.
The French had few doctors and even
fewer ambulances. Crates of bandages,
water bottles, and tents had been left be-
hind on the docks in Genoa. With four
veterinarians per thousand horses but
just one doctor per battalion, Napoleon
had prioritized the well- being of horses
over that of soldiers. Austrian ambu-
lances, packed to capacity, had already
left, and the Austrian military physi-
cians who stayed behind to help were
locked up in Milan with other POWs.
Dunant’s business trip turned into a
humanitarian mission. For the next two
weeks he mobilized boys to fetch clean
water and bandages and organizedshifts of women volunteers to carry
the water to dehydrated soldiers and
to clean maggot- infested wounds. He
turned a large church into a temporary
field hospital and assembled French and
Italian surgeons to perform mass ampu-
tations. He persuaded local residents to
give shelter even to Austrians and car-
riage drivers to evacuate them, bought
clean shirts and food for countless men,
and distributed tobacco widely, cogni-
zant of the lack of painkillers. Unafraid
of blood and bodily fluids, he held sol-
diers in their last moments.
Back in Geneva, Dunant cam-
paigned for a voluntary society to
care for wounded soldiers and an in-
ternational treaty that would protect
such efforts. After friends encouraged
him to put his proposals in writing, he
self- published A Memory of Solferino,
describing in detail the battle and its
appalling aftermath. Positively re-
ceived in France, it was soon translated
into German, Dutch, and Italian.
In February 1863 Dunant and his
allies cofounded the first incarnation
of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC). Dunant’s propos-
als gathered momentum after Charles
Dickens published several excerpts of
A Memory of Solferino in his maga-
zine All the Year Round. That October
representatives from fourteen govern-
ments and other delegates attended the
Geneva International Conference to
Study Ways of Overcoming the Inade-
quacy of Army Medical Services in the
Field. One of them, Florence Nightin-
gale, who had worked in military hos-
pitals during the Crimean War, wasn’t
convinced, arguing that voluntary
humanitarian societies would only en-
courage governments to shirk their duty
to care for the wounded. Rubenstein
notes that her views were dismissed
with more than a hint of misogyny.
In 1864 the Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded in Armies in the Field
was signed by all major European pow-
ers. In 1865 Britain and Turkey, then
the Ottoman Empire, joined. The Ot-
tomans’ accession surprised the com-
mittee, which had assumed that only
Christian belief could be a motive for
relieving human suffering. In fact, Is-
lamic humanitarian law predated the
convention by a millennium. Efforts to
reduce the worst effects of war appear
across all religions and throughout his-
tory. Dunant’s contribution was to cod-
ify these doctrines into a single treaty
and persuade governments to adopt it.
In 1882, after strenuous lobbying by
Clara Barton, known as “the American
Florence Nightingale” for nursing sol-
diers during the Civil War, the US gov-
ernment finally ratified the convention.The convention was adopted at a
time when medical intervention could
do little to change the course of war.
Most soldiers (and civilians) died from
cholera, typhus, pneumonia, and ma-
laria—infectious diseases that doctors
struggled to treat. If injured soldiers
survived the battlefield, they usually
succumbed to sepsis. Amputation was
the only treatment for gangrene. Since
the likelihood of injured soldiers re-Men inspecting a hospital damaged by an air strike in a rebel-controlled town, Eastern Ghouta, Syria, May 2017Sameer Al-Doumy/AFP/Getty ImagesSparrow 56 58 .indd 56 5 / 26 / 22 5 : 26 PM