June 23, 2022 57turning to combat was remote, medical
neutrality didn’t pose a threat to mili-
tary efforts.
Yet the second half of the nineteenth
century brought huge advances in med-
icine and public health. In 1853 John
Snow’s suc c essf u l del iver y of Queen Vic -
toria’s son Prince Leopold using chloro-
form created confidence in its anesthetic
powers. Nightingale’s approach to infec-
tion control during the Crimean War—
improved sewage, clean water, and
handwashing—drove reform of British
military medicine and public hospitals.
In 1861 Louis Pasteur published his
germ theory, and in 1864 its application
by the Scottish physician Charles Lister
transformed surgery. The development
of orthopedic splints reduced the need
for amputations and fostered advances
in reconstructive surgery.
Contrary to the requirements of the
Geneva Convention, these improve-
ments provided a military rationale
for depriving enemy troops of treat-
ment, and the incentive to use the Red
Cross symbol as a bull’s- eye. For exam-
ple, the German air force torpedoed
several British hospital ships during
World War I. In 1935–1936 Mussoli-
ni’s military campaign in Ethiopia in-
cluded seventeen air strikes on clearly
marked hospitals and ambulances. In-
ternational outrage forced the League
of Nations to investigate, but it took no
action. Hospitals in conflict zones re-
moved their Red Cross flags.
The more than 70 million dead in
World War II included twice as many
civilians as combatants, many of them
victims of indiscriminate bombing.
Global concern over the participation
of Nazi doctors in eugenics and meth-
ods of mass killing led to the creation of
the World Medical Association. Its first
act was to update the Hippocratic Oath
to impose a humanitarian duty on doc-
tors to provide care in any emergency.
The International Health Organiza-
tion of the League of Nations reinvented
itself as the World Health Organization
and took on health as a human right.
In 1948 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights included the right to
medical care. In 1949 the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention expanded protection
to civilians and redefined attacks tar-
geting medical care as a war crime, not
just a violation of humanitarian law.
Despite these protections, violations
continued. The Biafran war in Nigeria
in the late 1960s was significant for the
bombing of several ICRC hospitals and
the founding of Doctors Without Bor-
ders. American protests against the
Vietnam War and civilian harm added
impetus to the ICRC’s campaign for
the 1977 Additional Protocols, which
strengthened civilian protections and
specifically prohibited punishing phy-
sicians who provided impartial care to
perceived enemies.
Throughout the civil war in El Sal-
vador, between 1980 and 1992, doctors
were arrested, abducted, and killed.
In areas held by insurgent groups, the
Salvadoran government withheld es-
sential medicines, obstructed aid, and
impeded vaccination campaigns. Yet it
was not until the conflict in Bosnia that
WHO displayed any awareness of this
issue. Following an urgent request from
the UN Refugee Agency, in September
1992 WHO sent a mission to Bosnia. By
then, Serbian forces had destroyed 30
percent of Bosnia’s hospitals and killed
some four hundred medics, and Sara-
jevo was under siege. In 1993 a WorldHealth Assembly (WHA) resolution fi-
nally condemned the attacks but took
no further action.Bosnia was Rubenstein’s first experi-
ence of war. In 1996, when he became
the director of the US group Physicians
for Human Rights, his first duty was to
travel to Sarajevo to release its report
describing these atrocities. A dozen
reporters showed up at the press con-
ference, but the report received little
international coverage. He recounts:The lack of attention was my first
lesson among many to follow, that
assaults on health care in war were
widespread, but... addressing them
was not a global health, diplomatic,
or human rights priority.Attacks on hospitals and clinics in
Rwanda, Burundi, Chechnya, and So-
malia—all described in Rubenstein’s
book—also provoked little response.
He notes the paradoxical contrast over
the next decade between the increasing
investment in global health security,
such as the 2005 International Health
Regulations, and the international in-
difference to the growing problem of
violence against medical workers, aid
workers, and UN personnel.
The most extreme example is Syria.
After the Syrian government vio-
lently responded to peaceful protests
on March 17, 2011, injured protesters
could not seek treatment without facing
arrest from security forces embedded
in public hospitals. Ambulances at-
tempting to respond to massacres were
ambushed and doctors were murdered.
Government forces also targeted the
paramedics of the Syrian Arab Red
Crescent, the country’s branch of the
Red Cross. Checkpoints were set up to
stop anyone from smuggling lifesaving
medicines to clinics providing care to
protesters. The Ministry of Defense
confiscated blood bags.
In 2012, after the violence escalated
into fully fledged armed conflict, Syr-
ian doctors adapted to the government
air strikes targeting hospitals, clinics,
medical laboratories, and blood banks
by moving facilities into basements and
caves, eventually building entire hospi-
tals underground. Beginning in 2014,
Syrian Ministry of Health officials “de-
leted” critical medicines and surgical
items from lists of approved aid from
UN convoys to besieged areas, depriv-
ing millions of civilians of essential
medical supplies.
After Russia entered the war in Sep-
tember 2015, attacks on medical facil-
ities and personnel escalated, despite
the UN Security Council resolution in
May 2016 condemning them. In Sep-
tember 2016 Russian forces bombed a
thirty- one- truck humanitarian convoy
just outside besieged eastern Aleppo.
In April 2017 a carefully orchestrated
attack on the town of Khan Sheikhoun
illustrated this exceptionally cruel strat-
egy. Conventional bombing designed to
drive people into basements was fol-
lowed by air strikes with chemical weap-
ons, which tended to seep into those
basements. When survivors sought
medical care, the Russians tracked
their movements to the carefully hid-
den Al Rahma hospital and then either
gave its coordinates to the Syrian air
force or bombed it themselves.
In February 2018 the Russian air
force began its campaign to break East-ern Ghouta by bombing twenty- five
hospitals in four days. Yet in Septem-
ber of that year, ignoring the evidence
of hundreds of intentional attacks on
health care facilities, the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) pursued a “deconflic-
tion strategy” in the northwestern city
of Idlib. Under heavy pressure, Syrian
doctors provided OCHA with the co-
ordinates of the facilities that they had
carefully hidden underground, which
OCHA then gave to Russia, convinced
that this would deter its attacks. As
Rubenstein describes, Russian forces
then targeted them precisely.
The Syrian and Russian governments
also targeted public health measures:
when polio reappeared in mid- 2013
after an eighteen- year absence, it was
the consequence of withholding vac-
cines from areas deemed politically
hostile. WHO and UNICEF explained
the outbreak as the result of conflict,
though neighboring Iraq remained
free of polio over eight years of war,
until it spread to Baghdad from Syria
in 2014. In 2017, during an outbreak of
vaccine- derived polio, a sign of long-
standing undervaccination, a Russian
missile attack on a vital vaccine hub
in Deir Ezzor destroyed 150,000 vac-
cine doses. The two outbreaks crippled
well over one hundred children. Along
similar lines, the government withheld
chlorine for water treatment, facilitat-
ing the return of typhus, hepatitis A,
and other waterborne diseases (includ-
ing polio). These actions amounted to
passive biological warfare.Systematic attacks on health care
also feature in contemporary conflicts
in Ethiopia and Myanmar, both of
which have unfolded since Rubenstein
finished his book. Tigray, Ethiopia’s
mountainous northernmost region,
is home to around six million people.
Conflict erupted there in November
2020 following simmering tensions
between the Ethiopian government
and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation
Front (TPLF), the political party that
effectively ruled the country from
1991 until 2018, when Prime Minister
Abiy Ahmed took power. Abiy prom-
ised a free press and free elections in
2020, and made peace with neighboring
Eritrea, for which he was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. In March
2020, citing twenty- five reported cases of
Covid- 19, Abiy postponed the elections.
Tigrayan officials rejected the indefinite
delay and held their own regional elec-
tion, winning overwhelming support.
In response the Ethiopian govern-
ment invited in the Eritrean military
and closed access to the region. Ethio
Telecom, the sole provider, shut down
Internet and cell service across the
whole country (a private network was
maintained for governments and close
allies). Homes, hospitals, schools,
and other public infrastructure were
bombed. Government and allied mi-
litia troops massacred hundreds of ci-
vilians, burned crops, destroyed food
stores, and raped tens of thousands of
women and girls.
Following the capture of towns in
Tigray, troops systematically looted
hospitals, health care centers, and phar-
macies, and destroyed medicines and
essential equipment. Hospitals were oc-
cupied and ambulances seized. These
attacks appeared designed to deprive
the civilian population of access to care.Pregnant women and survivors of
sexual assault are especially harmed
by the destruction of health care. Be-
cause of a lack of ambulances and tight
restrictions on civilian movement,
women with difficult labors cannot
get medical help. The mass rape and
violence committed by Eritrean and
Ethiopian forces in Tigray have been
exceptionally cruel—women have
been sexually tortured and mutilated
with the aim of not just humiliation
but sterilization. The consequences
are physically catastrophic as well as
socially devastating.
In June 2021 Tigrayan forces
mounted a successful counteroffensive
and retook part of the region. Federal
authorities as well as regional govern-
ments in Afar and Amhara severely
restricted humanitarian aid and per-
mitted only a fraction of needed food
aid. In August Tigrayan defense forces
looted at least one hospital in Amhara.
In northern Amhara in late August
and early September, Tigrayan soldiers
raped dozens of women at gunpoint. In
September, the government approved
an EU airdrop of food and nutrition
supplements but removed all medicines.
No trucks carrying humanitarian sup-
plies were able to enter Tigray between
December 15, 2021, and April 1, 2022.
In Myanmar, a military coup in Feb-
ruary 2021 set off protests across the
country. As in Syria, the junta met
peaceful demonstrators with brutal re-
pression, detaining, shooting, and kill-
ing unarmed civilians. Physicians have
been targeted both for their support of
the antijunta movement, including join-
ing prodemocracy protests and strikes,
and for treating injured civilians.
The junta has been responsible for 95
percent of attacks against health care
workers and facilities. From the time
of the coup to March 31, 2022, govern-
ment forces arrested 564 health work-
ers, killed thirty- six medics, and raided
126 hospitals, occupying at least fifty-
six of them. In November, eighty med-
ical personnel were detained. Eight of
these arrests were of female medics as-
sociated with the anti- junta movement.
Another medic was shot at close range,
execution- style. On Christmas Eve,
thirty- five civilians, including women
and children, were burned to death
when government troops set fire to ve-
hicles, one of which was clearly marked
Save the Children.
The junta diverts Covid- 19 vaccines
and treatment to military personnel
and has been using them as bait. Med-
ics are lured by the militia to respond
to false Covid- 19 emergencies, only
to be arrested. In June 2021 the junta
arrested a forty- five- year- old surgical
lecturer at Mandalay University of
Medicine, accusing him of having ties
to the shadow opposition described
by the junta as a terrorist group. After
contracting the virus in prison, he was
denied timely treatment and died.^In March 2011, at Rubenstein’s initia-
tive, sixteen organizations asked WHO
director- general Dr. Margaret Chan
“to engage the agency in addressing
problems of violence against health-
care.” Chan was receptive, and in her
opening speech at the World Health
Assembly she condemned Bahrain’s
attacks on dozens of doctors. By the
fall, Rubenstein had put together a
coalition of NGOs and universities to
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