including two senators each from the two territories whose terms are aligned
with those of the House of Representatives). In the first instance, this
created very closely divided Senates, government majorities rarely exceeding
five. Subsequently, the major parties (ALP, Liberal, and National) have
seen their virtual monopoly of Senate seats disappear at the hands of a
succession of minor parties (Democratic Labor (1955–74), Australian Demo-
crats (1978–2007), and Greens (since 1990)) and independents. As at 2015,
apart from the territory senators, a quarter of the seats in the Senate are held by
various cross-benchers, of whom the Greens is the largest group.
The elective quality of the Australian Senate has, in the past three decades,
been eroded as a consequence of an amendment to the Constitution in 1977
(new section 15). Under that amendment, where a vacancy arises in the
Senate, whether as a consequence of death or resignation, the replacement
must be a nominee of the previous senator’s party and serves the entirety of
the remainder of the term. Previously, under proportional representation (PR),
there was a gentlemen’s agreement tofill vacancies from the former (late)
senator’s party until the next general election for the House of Representatives
or periodical election of senators; the gentlemen’s agreement was not always
observed, conspicuously with regard to notfilling a vacancy in Queensland in
1975 arising from death of a Labor senator.
The consequence is that resignations from the Senate, which previously ran
at half the rate of those from the House of Representatives, now run at twice
the rate or more; this is because a resignation does not put a seat at risk. It is a
classic instance of Machiavelli’s precept that it is rare, in human affairs, that in
remedying one deficiency we do not create another. The House of Represen-
tatives remains an exclusively elected House; the only method of entry is by
election, whether at a general election or a by-election.
In the UK, as a consequence of the Budget controversy of 1909–10, the
powers of the House of Lords were significantly curtailed, leaving it with only
a suspensive veto over non-financial legislation. In 1958 a system of life
peerages was adopted, bringing extensive and continuing expansion of the
House’s membership. Under the Blair government, all but a handful of her-
editary peers were removed from the House, and various non-partisan
appointment procedures have been developed.
The Canadian Senate is a federal chamber, as in Australia and the USA. But
unlike Australian and American counterparts, the provinces of Canada are
not represented equally. The aspiration to equality in the Canadian Senate is
expressed regionally. Each of the four designated regions—Maritimes (Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island); Quebec; Ontario; and Western
(Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia)—has twenty-four sen-
ators. The remainder of Canada, including Newfoundland, a former dominion
which joined Canada in 1949, has nine seats.
Australia’s Distinctive Governance