22 Asia The EconomistJuly 22nd 2017
T
HE Philippine army has been fighting for two full months to
take back control of the southern city of Marawi from a viol-
ent and determined coalition of jihadist groups. The battle for
Marawi, a mainly Muslim city of 200,000 with a lush lakeside
setting and a proud sense of its culture, erupted when the govern-
ment got word that Isnilon Hapilon was hiding there. Mr Hapi-
lon, a leader of a notorious kidnap-for-ransom gang, Abu Sayyaf,
pledged allegiance to IslamicState (IS) three years ago. In return,
ISdeclared him the “emir” of the Philippine province of its caliph-
ate. When the armed forces went to arrest him, up to 700 fighters
emerged out of nowhere and, in the name ofIS, seized the city.
Ominously, foreign fighters and even veterans of Mosul are
thought to be involved, including militants from Chechnya, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.
The army has fought back hard, claiming to have killed 411
combatants. Its spokesman, Brigadier-General Restituto Padilla,
now talks of “mopping up”, with the remaining insurgents
penned into an area of a square kilometre, encompassing the
commercial district. But the militants do not scruple to use hu-
man shields—dozensof civilians have already died, and 300 are
thought still to be trapped. That limits the army’s room for
manoeuvre.
The army, too, has taken losses: nearly 100 soldiers killed and
over 850 wounded out of a force of about 3,000. In Marawi this
week it was clear the battle was far from over, with new units ar-
riving in the cityand helicopter gunships flyingin for an after-
noon attack, the thump of their rotors briefly drowning out the
rattle of machineguns and the snap of sniper fire.
The outcome is not in doubt. ButPresident Rodrigo Duterte’s
recent predictions of a swift victory were far from the mark.
Meanwhile, evacuees languish in their tens of thousands in dirty
camps. A growing number realise they have no home to return
to—much of the city has been flattened.
The Philippines has had its share of conflict, particularly in
Mindanao, a poor and restive southern island that ishome to
most Filipino Muslims. But this is the heaviest urban fighting
since the second world war. Marawi came as a shock. Whenever
one or other of a welter of bandit groups declared an ISaffiliation,
the authorities had tended to dismiss it as boastful self-branding.The Maute group is a case in point. It is based in Lanao del Sur,
the province of which Marawi is the capital. Even after it pledged
allegiance to ISin 2015, many mistook it for a low-grade family
mafia, with links to Marawi’s former mayor, Solitario Ali, whom
Mr Duterte has denounced as a drug lord.
Yet both Omar Maute (said by the army to be dead) and his
brother, Abdullah, had studied in the Middle East. They had links
with jihadistsin Indonesia. At home, they even recruited from
among faculty and students at Mindanao State University in Ma-
rawi. The Maute group putup over half the fighters who seized
Marawi, all the while advertising its role on social media. All this
suggests unusual sophistication and strength.
Mr Hapilon is now thought to be injured and sheltering in Ma-
rawi’s biggest mosque (which the army is reluctant to attack, fear-
ing a propaganda disaster). Abdullah Maute still seems to be in
Marawi too, while his parents have been caught trying to escape.
Some hope this will prove to be the end of the Maute gang and of
Mr Hapilon.
Perhaps. But their propaganda is already painting the city’s de-
struction as the army’s fault. The dead jihadists leave behind or-
phans to be fed a diet of revenge. The pestilent, overcrowded pri-
sons of the Philippines and Indonesia will continue as prime
recruiting grounds for extremism. Meanwhile, that the Mautes,
Abu Sayyaf and two smaller groups were able together to seize a
medium-sized city shows howISideology can unite disparate
groups to devastating effect. ThatISis nearing its end in the Mid-
dle Eastshould not be misconstrued. The wilds of Mindanao of-
fer a destination for retreating jihadists. For young South-East
Asian extremists, saysSidney Jones of the Institute for Policy
Analysis of Conflict in Jakarta, Marawi “has put the Philippines
on the map”.Mindanao’s the time
And so Mr Duterte will not lack reasons to extend the 60-day im-
position of martial law in Mindanao that is about to expire. He
suggests keeping it till the end of the year, butsome allies argue
for five years, till the end of his term. More will become clear in
his annual state of the nation address on July 24th. The army says
martial law makes it easier to conduct house-to-house searches
and seize weapons. It insists it hasno wish to govern—suspects
are handed over to civilian courts. Butopposition politicians and
civil-society groups say martial law undermines accountability
in a region desperately short of it—and raises questions about the
long-term intentions of Mr Duterte, an avowed authoritarian.
Martial law will surely complicate the broader “peace pro-
cess” in Mindanao. In 1996 the government struck a deal with
Muslim separatists to create an autonomous region in the Mus-
lim-majority areas ofthe island; it broke down five years later. In
2014 a similar deal was struck with the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the region’s main insurgent group. As a measure of
its commitment to peace, the MILFhas been working to get hu-
manitarian supplies to Marawi’s residents and to broker the re-
lease of civilians still stuck in the battle zone.
Mr Duterte supports autonomy, but has muddied the process
with vague proposals on federalism. Meanwhile, the MILF’s in-
ability to head off the fighting in Marawi, even though many of its
members have relatives in the Maute group, hasundermined its
authority. Some of the MILF’s younger members are said to be
disaffected with its ageing leadership. When the battle for Ma-
rawi ends, the war for hearts and minds begins. 7Mosul in Mindanao
Defeating Islamist insurgents in battle is not the same as winning the warBanyan