256 Anke von Kügelgen
For a better assessment of the value of Ibn Taymiyya’s critiques, I
shall in the first part briefly place them in the context of other Muslim
refutations of logic and philosophy and shortly present the two works
and their main addressees. Part two focuses on Ibn Taymiyya’s distinc-
tion between the rationalists’ and the “clear” reason and traces peripa-
tetic tenets in his own theory of knowledge and interlinked ontological
assumptions. The two parts are connected, but can be read seperatedly.
1. Greek Poison
The enemies of philosophy (falsafa/ḥikma falsafiyya) regarded their
practitioners, the falāsifa, as followers of the Greek unbelievers, as
heretics and as “freethinkers” who reflected on what is inconceiv-
able to the senses and immediate understanding without recourse
to the divine revelation. The Muslim philosophers themselves,
like al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), and Ibn Rushd
(d. 595/1198) – all of whom Ibn Taymiyya extensively criticizes –
philosophized mainly on the ground of a corpus of Greek wisdom
with the conviction that it led to true happiness. They paraphrased,
commented upon, modified, criticized or harmonized the writings of
Aristotle and Plato especially, being persuaded that – because they
relied on sound reasoning – they basically represented the ultimate
truth.^12 In their view, mankind had gained an infallible instrument
to reach truth with the logic (al-manṭiq) Aristotle and his disciples
had elaborated and systemized and declared as the propaedeutics of
philosophy. So, in the theoretical sciences, especially in metaphysics,
i. e. the field of knowledge which rose the greatest suspicion, their
instrument of reasoning was the demonstrative, apodictic syllogism
(burhān/qiyās burhānī) which was based on indubitable premises.^13
12 Arnaldez, Roger: Falsafa, in: EI^2 , vol. 2 (1991), pp. 769–775; Arnaldez, Rog-
er: Falāsifa, in: EI^2 , vol. 2 (1991), pp. 764–767; Endress, Gerhard: Die wissen-
schaftliche Literatur, in: Wolfdietrich Fischer (ed.): Grundriss der Arabischen
Philologie, Wiesbaden 1992, suppl., vol. 3, pp. 25–57.
13 See for instance al-Fārābī, Abū Naṣr: Risāla fī al-ʿAql, ed. by Maurice Bouyges,
Beirut 1938, pp. 7.9–9.3, 11.10–12.3; idem: al-Manṭiq ʿind al-Farābī, ed., intr., and
comm. by Rafīq al-ʿAjam, Beirut 1985–1986, vol. 1 (Naṣṣ al-tawṭiʾa), p. 57.2–9;
idem: Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm, ed. by Angel González Palencia, Madrid 1932, pp. 23–24;
and Ibn Rushd who in substance embraces al-Fārābī’s view: Ibn Rushd: Kitāb
Faṣl al-maqāl with Its Appendix (ḍamīma) and an Extract from Kitāb al-Kashf
ʿan manāhij al-adilla, ed. by George F. Hourani, Leiden 1959, pp. 2, 17, 19–21,
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