296 Anke von Kügelgen
example that Ibn Sīnā, for instance, uses to discredit induction as a way
of inference that can lead to certainty.^188
Yet, although Ibn Taymiyya himself makes no explicit categoriza-
tion, one can distinguish in al-Radd ʿalā al-manṭiqiyyīn three catego-
ries of universals that Ibn Taymiyya holds to be absolutely true.^189 One
consists of the axioms, i. e., the primary arithmetic, geometric, and log-
ical principles, such as one being half of two, the total being more than
the part, or the incompatibility of contraries.^190 Ibn Taymiyya consid-
ers them in Naqḍ al-manṭiq as a priori knowledge and in al-Radd ʿalā
al-manṭiqiyyīn as gained by the observation of one single particular.^191
The conviction that all concepts, including the rational axioms, are
inferred through sense perceptions, which is in fact one of the cor-
nerstones of Empiricism, had already been upheld in Islamic realms
since the tenth century, by, among others, the renowned Shii theolo-
gian Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (597/1201–672/1274), with whose writings
Ibn Taymiyya was quite familiar.^192 Although he regarded these prin-
ciples as certain, Ibn Taymiyya does not rank this knowledge and the
sciences based upon them as something especially precious. He asserts
their validity, refers to mathematics as the most valid (aṣaḥḥ) of the
rational sciences,^193 and even admits in one place that it can help the
soul to become “accustomed to sound knowledge, to valid and truth-
ful propositions, as well as to valid syllogisms” and “to utter the truth
188 Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wal-tanbīhāt, vol. 1, pp. 367–368; Avicenna, Remarks and
Admonitions, p. 129.
189 Wael B. Hallaq already pointed out two of the categories, the “universal state-
ments embodied in the revealed texts” and the primary principles (Hallaq, Ibn
Taymiyya, pp. 30–31).
190 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, pp. 108–109. See ibid., pp. 133–134; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd
al-qarīḥa, pp. 238–239; Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, p. 56.
191 Ibn Taymiyya, Naqḍ al-manṭiq, p. 202; idem, al-Radd, pp. 108–109, 316;
al-Suyūṭī, Jahd al-qarīḥa, pp. 222–223, 317; Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 36–37,
145–146. For Ibn Taymiyya’s obvious difficulty to explain men’s apprehension
of the so-called self-evident principles and their being certain in spite of being
universal, see Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, p. xxxi-xxxii and below, chapters 11.2–3.
192 Van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre, pp. 188–189. That Ibn Taymiyya was well
acquainted with the teachings of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is obvious (Ibn Taymiy-
ya, al-Radd, pp. 15, 149; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd al-qarīḥa, pp. 207, 250; Hallaq, Ibn
Taymiyya, pp. 13, n. 18; 70 , n. 103; Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. 11
“Fihris al-aʿlām”, s. v. Ṭūsī. See also Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et
politiques, p. 97.)
193 Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. I, p. 158; transl. by Michot, Vanités
intellectuelles, p. 606.
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