The Poison of Philosophy 321
things have no essences that make them belong to a species or genus
(see chapters 10.1, 11.2), he also accepts attributes as common factors,
which a Peripatetic would regard as accidental. This is a natural result
of the equation of syllogism and analogy. The juridical analogy in par-
ticular often has premises given by a Koranic verse or a saying of the
prophet Muḥammad, which Peripatetic logicians would not classify
as essential attributes. Thus, jurists often take the faculty of upsetting
good behavior as the ratio legis for the prohibition of alcoholic drinks
other than grape wine, and Ibn Taymiyya does not deny but supports
this;^291 upsetting good behavior is an attribute that might compromise
many other things besides alcohol.
In further contrast to the logicians, Ibn Taymiyya held analogy in
higher esteem than syllogism. He argues that in analogy there is always
an original case of a particular, which makes it easier for the mind to
understand the common universal.^292
Another eminent disparity lies in the fact that Muslim philosophers
regard syllogism as the way to establish God’s existence, whereas Ibn
Taymiyya denies to both kinds of inferences, syllogism and analogy,
the ability to establish the knowledge of God and the prophecy (ithbāt
al-ʿilm bil-ṣāniʿ wal-nubuwwāt) and acknowledges it only to inferences
by signs or the a fortiori argument (see chapter 12).^293
Still, for Ibn Taymiyya, the weakness of analogy and syllogism does
not diminish their value. Ibn Taymiyya is convinced that “an authori-
tative wording of the prophets cannot be in conflict with a sound infer-
ence (qiyās ṣaḥīḥ), be it a juridical or a rational one.”^294 Where there
291 Ibn Taymiyya also mentions it as a ratio legis (al-Radd, p. 372; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd
al-qarīḥa, p. 333; Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, p. 162); see Bernand, Ḳ iyās, p. 241.
292 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, p. 364; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd al-qarīḥa, p. 331; Hallaq, Ibn
Taymiyya, p. 159.
293 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, p. 356; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd al-qarīḥa, p. 329; Hallaq, Ibn
Taymiyya, pp. 157–158. Ibn Taymiyya argues similarly in his Risālat al-Qiyās
(p. 50) when he blames the philosophers and kalām theologians for their
drawing of analogies between matters, such as the necessity of God and the
necessity of the creatures, which, in fact, “impose the outmost difference.” I
share Jon Hoover’s interpretation of this passage that “in matters of theologi-
cal doctrine, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the juristic analogy is always invalid
because it brings God and creatures into a relationship of direct comparison”
(Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, p. 57).
294 Fa-lā yakhtalifu naṣṣ thābit ʿan al-rasūl wa-qiyās ṣaḥīḥ – lā qiyās sharʿī [anal-
ogy] wa-lā ʿaqlī [syllogism] (Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, p. 373; it is not included
in al-Suyūṭī’s abridgement); see his Risālat al-Qiyās, where he also states that
what is in the Sharia cannot contradict the sound inference (p. 14); for further
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