324 Anke von Kügelgen
cannot be subsumed under a universal whose instances are equal; the
unblemished perfection affirmed of others is, a fortiori, affirmed of
Him.”^306 Jon Hoover has shown that Ibn Taymiyya uses the a forti-
ori extensively to prove God’s wisdom and justice and thereby often
draws inferences from human characteristics to display what applies
all the more to God.^307 Obviously, in Ibn Taymiyya’s eyes “the a for-
tiori argument preserves the unlikeness between God and creatures,
which univocal use of analogy and syllogism fails to respect.”^308 Ibn
Taymiyya, thus, displays here a nominalistic attitude suggesting that
“there is no longer any similarity between the referents of identi-
cal names when they are particularized in the Creator and the crea-
ture apart from the very names themselves.”^309 Both of these two
methods – the inference by sign and the a fortiori argument – reveal
that Ibn Taymiyya conceives the Koran as bearing in itself rational
proofs drawn from or concerned with the ontological sphere. Anal-
ogy included (see chapter 11), Ibn Taymiyya thus identifies three
methods of inference mentioned in the Koran.
In fact, as has already been demonstrated several times, Ibn Taymiyya
gives priority to scripture if it conflicts with reason.^310 His arguments
rest on the presumption that “reason has proved the truth of scripture
and the necessity of accepting that which the messenger has related.”^311
Therefore, it cannot be given priority, because that would contradict
its own verdict of the truth of scripture. However, when Ibn Taymiyya
asserts that “the message brought by the apostle conforms with sound
306 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, pp. 150, 154–157, 350–351; shortened: al-Suyūṭī, Jahd
al-qarīḥa, pp. 252, 255; Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 71, 74–75.
307 Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, pp. 56–62, 130–135, 156 et passim (see
index, s. v. highest similitude).
308 Ibid., p. 62. See Wael B. Hallaq, who distinguishes between analogy and the
a fortiori argument, arguing that in the latter case, in contrast to analogy, the
similarity is no prerequisite and that “the a fortiori argument is asyllogistic,
and has virtually nothing to do with the category of analogical inferences”
(Hallaq, Wael B.: A History of Islamic Legal Theories. An Introduction to
Sunnī uṣūl al-fiqh, Cambridge 1997, p. 99)
309 Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, p. 51.
310 Heer, The Priority of Reason, pp. 190–191.
311 Al-ʿaql qad dalla ʿalā ṣiḥḥat al-samʿ wa-wujūb qubūl mā akhbara bihi al-rasūl
ṣallā Allāh ʿalayhi wa-sallam, Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. 1, p. 170;
Heer, The Priority of Reason, pp. 190–191. (I follow his translation). See
Michot, Lettre à Abū l-Fidāʾ, pp. 18, 57–58; Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy,
pp. 30–32.
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