The Poison of Philosophy 325
tradition and uncontaminated reason,”^312 he does not limit reason to
the teachings of the Koran and the soundly transmitted deeds and
utterances of Muḥammad and his companions. “Uncontaminated”
reason can lead man to truths independently from revelation, as has
been shown in the last chapters. Still, revealed truths remain the touch-
stone. Scripture can correct errors, i. e., conclusions that reason has
falsely considered true. Scripture is thus the ultimate measure of truth.
Conclusion
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of the rationalists, on the one hand, and his
own epistemology, on the other, have to be seen against the back-
ground of the philosophical terminology, categories, and concepts
which dominated wide realms of knowledge at his time. Many emi-
nent kalām theologians and Sufis had accepted Peripatetic logic as
the rational method to reach truth. Each of them, however, rejected
philosophical metaphysical tenets that they saw in conflict with essen-
tial religious dogmas. Nonetheless, their own theories were more or
less markedly imprinted by philosophy. Ibn Taymiyya did not escape
this rule. As our glimpses into his struggle for and against reason have
shown, intense preoccupation with the writings of the rationalists left
distinct imprints on his terminology and on a key concept of his epis-
temology and ontology. Al-Dhahabī’s somewhat polemical statement
about Ibn Taymiyya’s addiction to the poison of the philosophers was
not completely ill-founded.
On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya himself regarded logic and phi-
losophy as a great danger, i. e., as a kind of poison that corrupts reason
and distracts from what benefits the soul. He would certainly have vig-
orously disputed any influence of the philosophers and the late kalām
theologians on his own doctrines, let alone being called a philosopher.
In his two closely interlinked works, al-Radd ʿalā al-manṭiqiyyīn and
Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql, he harshly criticizes the philosophers’
ways of reasoning and concept of reason in general, dismissing the
claim that Peripatetic logic is the sole and universal means to truth.
Although he decisively denies its universality, his struggle against
logic does not lead him to negate the existence of a universal canon
312 Al-Qawl alladhī jāʾa bihi al-rasūl wa-huwa al-muwāfiq li-ṣaḥīḥ al-manqūl
wa-ṣarīḥ al-ʿuqūl, Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. 9, p. 67.
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