326 Anke von Kügelgen
of true understanding. Instead, he posits a faculty of true reasoning
shared by all healthy human beings, the “clear reason” that is uncon-
taminated by Peripatetic logic, and he asserts the complete congruence
of its knowledge with that of “sound religious tradition.” Ibn Taymiy-
ya gives no systematic account of his concept of “clear reason” and
his epistemology in general, but his many statements concerning the
immediate ways to true knowledge and the methods of cognition and
inferences he considers capable of producing true knowledge allow
a rather precise idea of it. If my understanding of some of the main
features of Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology is right, the “uncontami-
nated reason” comprises more than mere “common sense.” Indeed,
Ibn Taymiyya diverges much less from some major Peripatetic episte-
mological principles and interlinked ontological assumptions than he
often pretends to do, especially in the case of his overall denial of an
extramental existence of the universals.
Yet Ibn Taymiyya himself states at the very beginning of his “Refu-
tation of the Logicians” – right after his declaration that logic is super-
fluous – that he first considered the propositions of logic as true and
then discovered the falseness of “some of them,” thereby clearly stat-
ing that he holds others to be true, and he frankly admits it in regard
to the form of the first figure of categorical syllogism. Other points
of congruity, however, are not mentioned. Among the main ways that
provide immediate, i. e., certain, evident knowledge, Ibn Taymiyya
counts sense perceptions, experiences, multiply transmitted reports,
and widespread propositions. By including widespread propositions
among immediate knowledge, he regarded a broader spectrum of
knowledge as certain than that regarded by the philosophers and some
“later” kalām theologians.
But the remaining congruity is great. Ibn Taymiyya’s belief in the
truth of sense perception was, in principle, shared by friend and foe,
although his conviction that concepts are formed directly by the sens-
es was rather uncommon. In addition, Ibn Taymiyya left open some
questions that were much disputed, namely how to conceive “errors
of the senses” or false judgments about right perceptions. The distinc-
tion Ibn Taymiyya adopts between necessary knowledge and acquired
knowledge had been made already in the early times of Muslim theol-
ogy and was also held by the falāsifa. He is, however, closer to the “lat-
er” kalām theologians and the philosophers in asserting that certain
knowledge is provided not only by sense apprehensions and multiply
transmitted reports, but also by experience. He shares the conviction
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