The Poison of Philosophy 327
that some people are able to form concepts and judgments by imme-
diate insight, i. e., without cogitation. The most striking congruity
between Ibn Taymiyya’s teaching and the theories of the philosophers,
however, is the tenet of an extramental existence of the universals in
the particulars and man’s principal capacity to gain a true concept of
them. This adherence to “moderate realism” stands in sharp contrast
to his nominalistic attitude of denying any extramental existence of
universals whatsoever in the course of his direct rejection of the real
definition and the rules of syllogistic logic.
The “moderate realism” he reveals while explaining the causality
of empirical matters and the common factor (ratio legis/middle term)
on which the judgments of the juridical analogy and the philosophical
syllogism are built rests on two main assumptions he shares with the
Peripatetics. The first assumption is that there are similar particulars
that are bestowed with powers or essences that are specific to their
genus or species; and second, that their powers to “act” or “react” can
be hindered by impediments.
On the basis of other writings of Ibn Taymiyya, Jon Hoover has
convincingly shown that Ibn Taymiyya tried to give man the respon-
sibility for his destiny without denying God’s omnipotence. Causality
thus looks “natural” from the “human perspective” while it is “instru-
mental” from the “divine perspective.” God can, if He wills, hinder a
cause from producing its effect by creating an impediment, or He can
neglect to perfect the combination of causes needed for the effect. Still,
in view of His all-embracing wise purpose, He will not change the
order and natures He fixed for His creatures. Against this background
of “compatibilism,” Ibn Taymiyya’s denial of the existence of univer-
sals in rebus gains no plausibility. That a cause can be hindered from
producing its effect by an impediment or an imperfect combination of
causes is not alien to the philosophers’ view of causality. The difference
lies in the explanation of such an impediment, and on this level, there
is doubtless a huge gap between Ibn Taymiyya’s and the philosophers’
view of God and the universe.
The denial of the existence of universals in rebus also gains no plau-
sibility if one takes into account Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine that God has
no like. Since analogy and syllogism are built on the parity of the sub-
jects of their propositions, he excludes analogy and syllogism as means
to prove God’s existence or to make statements about Him and thus
takes a nominalistic attitude. He assumes, however, that God’s crea-
tures are not unique in kind, i. e., that they share common attributes,
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