The Curse of Philosophy 339
Ṭabaṭabāʾī’s presentation of this topic: compared with Francis Bacon
(1561–1626)^52 , Ibn Taymiyya argues “in clear scientific language”
that a judgment achieved through syllogistic evidence is correct if
the premises are proven to be correct; this can only be done through
empirical investigation prior to establishing the form of syllogism.
In this regard, Ṭabaṭabāʾī notes that Ibn Taymiyya uses analogy to
ascribe a decisive role to practical experience in developing philo-
sophical judgments. For Ibn Taymiyya – and thus for Ṭabaṭabāʾī –
empirical knowledge results from “both sense and reason” (al-ḥiss
wal-ʿaql kilāhumā maʿan); Ibn Taymiyya’s favorite examples come
from medicine and jurisprudence, both disciplines in which theo-
ry and practice are intrinsically interconnected.^53 Furthermore, his
methodological doubt regarding the value of Aristotelian logic for
the achievement of rational knowledge precedes the critique made by
John Locke (1632–1704),^54 and the readers of Ibn Taymiyya’s critique
of Aristotelian logic would find the same arguments and nominal
interpretation of the definition^55 brought by John Stuart Mill (1806–
1873)^56 five centuries later. Finally, Ibn Taymiyya’s nominal defini-
tion predates Bertrand Russell’s (1872–1970) critique of Aristotle and
can even answer some of his questions.^57
In conclusion to this section, it is relevant to point out that Ibn
Taymiyya’s refutation of logic has been connected, so al-Nashshār, to
ancient philosophers who raised doubt concerning the epistemological
value of Aristotle’s logic. Nevertheless, it seems nearly impossible to
establish any concrete link between Ibn Taymiyya and Sextus Empiri-
cus or any of the Skeptics, as their writings were, as far as known, never
52 Bacon, Francis: Novum Organon/The New Organon, edited by Lisa Jardine
and Michael Silverthorne, Cambridge and New York 2000.
53 Ṭabaṭabāʾī, al-Mufakkirūn, pp. 130–131; Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, pp. 437–
438/393–394.
54 Ṭabaṭabāʾī, al-Mufakkirūn, pp. 135–138. See Locke, John: An Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding. Collated and Annotated with Biographical, Critical
and Historical Prolegomena by Alexander Campbell Fraser, New York 1959,
especially book 4, chapter 17.
55 Ṭabaṭabāʾī, al-Mufakkirūn, pp. 145–147. Al-Nashshār, Manāhij, pp. 162, 170,
178, is also interested in showing similarities between Ibn Taymiyya’s and Mill’s
critique of Aristotle’s logic.
56 Mill, John Stuart: A System of Logic, New York 1919.
57 Al-Nashshār, Manāhij, p. 162; Qadir, An Early Islamic Critic, pp. 499–501.
Further similar statements are referred to in von Kügelgen, Ibn Taymīyas Kritik
an der aristotelischen Logik, pp. 215–217.
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