The Curse of Philosophy 345
God’s care for the world and, thus, His continuous creating activity.^80
Wielding the same verses against the kalām-theologians, Ibn Taymiyya
points out that the Koran does not teach creation out of nothing^81 ;
like Ibn Rushd, he refutes the theological principle that “whatever is
not free of caused beings is itself caused” (mā lā yakhlū min ḥawādith
fa-huwa ḥādith), declaring it invalid according to both reason and the
Koran. In nearly Ibn Rushd’s own words Ibn Taymiyya states that the
“truth does not contradict itself” (al-ḥaqq lā yatanāqaḍ).^82
Ibn Taymiyya, in a position close to Ibn Rushd’s, as al-Ṣaghīr states,
asserts that the Koran and Hadith do not include any statement sup-
porting the theologians’ view that the contingent existents came into
being at a precise instant (al-ḥawādith lahā ibtidāʾ); indeed, this would
imply that God’s activity began at a certain point in time. This, howev-
er, does not mean that the world is eternal, as the philosophers argued:
for, believing in God’s eternal creating activity does not mean accept-
ing that the world is eternal; agency (al-fāʿiliyya) precedes action just
as the agent precedes the act. Ibn Taymiyya refers, in this regard, to the
same Koranic verses used by Ibn Rushd in a similar context and inter-
prets them in an astonishingly similar way.^83 Al-Ṣaghīr concludes that
a “unity of mind” (wiḥdat al-rūḥ) must exist between Ibn Taymiyya
and Ibn Rushd, who both use the same arguments to obtain the same
results. Yet, it must be noted that despite this basic agreement, each
thinker treats the Koranic text differently: Ibn Rushd, on the one hand,
draws it closer to Aristotle’s position, making demonstration the high-
est criterion of truth and asserting that the interpreted scripture nec-
essarily must agree with demonstration. Ibn Taymiyya, on the other
hand, strictly holds the view that the literal text of the Koran is valid
and does not need interpretation.^84
- Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Rushd deal also similarly with the theo-
logical question of causality. Criticizing the Ashʿarīs’ rejection of other
causes than God, they both assert with similar arguments that accept-
80 Regarding this, see von Kügelgen, Dialogpartner, pp. 470–472 with references to
relevant passages in Ibn Rushd’s and Ibn Taymiyya’s oeuvre.
81 Al-Ṣaghīr, Mawāqif, pp. 170–171. See, for instance, Koran (41:11).
82 Al-Ṣaghīr, Mawāqif, p. 172. See Ibn Rushd, Faṣl, p. 13; Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-
sunna al-nabawiyya fī naqḍ kalām al-shīʿa al-qadariyya, edited by Muḥammad
Rashād Sālim, Riyadh n. d., vol. 1, p. 300.
83 Al-Ṣaghīr, Mawāqif, pp. 173–175. Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, pp. 171–172; idem, Faṣl,
p. 21.
84 Al-Ṣaghīr, Mawāqif, p. 175.
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