346 Georges Tamer
ing natural causality is a requirement of both reason and the Koranic
belief in God’s wisdom as well. To deny the impact of causes is incon-
ceivable for both of them, inasmuch as such a denial would render
God’s wisdom and knowledge useless.^85
- Both Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyya agree, furthermore, that the
endeavor to harmonize kalām and falsafa failed on both sides. For
Ibn Taymiyya, those theologians who attempted to bring theological
and philosophical arguments to a synthesis defaulted into error and
contradiction. Al-Ghazālī is a favorite target of critique from both
thinkers, who accuse him of using contradictory rhetorical statements
(which he claimed to be demonstrative) and of being inconsistent with
his position. They likewise agree to criticize Ibn Sīnā; Ibn Taymiyya
interestingly traces Ibn Sīnā’s erroneous ideas back to the “deviated
(munḥarifa) Harranian Sabiasm”, a heritage he similarly imputes to
al-Fārābī.^86 It is mainly Ibn Sīnā’s attempt to provide proof for the exis-
tence of God that draws both Ibn Rushd’s and Ibn Taymiyya’s ire;
after all, Ibn Sīnā differentiated between two kinds of existence: the
necessary (al-wājib) and the possible (al-mumkin), in order to describe
the heavens as both eternal and possible.^87 - Al-Ṣaghīr points out that, in the context of his critique of Ibn Sīnā,
Ibn Taymiyya admits Ibn Rushd’s closeness to Aristotle, acknowledg-
ing that the Andalusian philosopher surpassed his Greek master in
his explanation of the movement of the heavenly spheres.^88 Addition-
ally, Ibn Taymiyya’s critical advance against the Muslim philosophers
of the East resembles that of Ibn Rushd, originating as it did from
similar principles. One of the reasons for the agreement is, accord-
ing to al-Ṣaghīr, the “traditionalist character” (al-ṭābiʿ al-salafī) of Ibn
Rushd’s approach in discussing theological questions, especially in his
philosophical-theological writings Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, Faṣl al-maqāl
and al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla. Ibn Rushd’s traditionalism is found
in his return to the “original, authentic, not distorted and not interpret-
ed” texts of Aristotle and the Koran.^89 Furthermore, both Ibn Rushd
85 Ibid., pp. 176–177. See Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, pp. 166–169, 193–194; Ibn Taymiy-
ya, al-Radd, p. 315/270.
86 Al-Ṣaghīr, Mawāqif, pp. 177–178.
87 Ibid., p. 179. On Ibn Sīnā’s position and Ibn Rushd’s critique of it see Davidson,
Herbert A.: Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, New York and Oxford 1987, pp. 281–335.
88 Al-Ṣaghīr, Mawāqif, p. 180.
89 Ibid., p. 181.
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