368 Georges Tamer
the most accurate form of human knowledge, consists, thus, of nothing
else but “cognitive values”; this renders knowledge (al-ʿilm), as such, to
be “hypothetic and deduced” (faraḍī istintājī). Related to the form of
an existent, it is equally as approximate in regards to its matter. Aristo-
telian demonstration is, thus, changed into the relative epistemological
outcome of a nominalistic process. An analytical result is reduced to a
formal one; its truth is merely a subject of cognitive evaluation. Conse-
quently, science cannot be absolute, as the pure rational axiomatic prin-
ciples are not part of the external existents, but belong to the realm of
subjective “cognitive values”. Analytical systems, then, are developed
out of optional starting points, each according to a specific practice, in
order to explain certain phenomena. Analysis (taḥlīl) results necessarily
from interpretation (taʾwīl) and is not opposite to it.
- On the second level, Ibn Taymiyya attempted to achieve a “revo-
lution” seeking to overthrow the “theory of science inherited from the
Greeks and the theory of existence supporting it, as well”. The out-
come of his endeavor is the knowledge that both religious and ratio-
nal sciences can share the same object, as religious sciences (al-ʿulūm
al-naqliyya) can deal with natural phenomena and rational sciences
(al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya) can deal with religious issues as well. All objects
of knowledge are nothing but rational, as reason is the only organ of
knowledge – which is also valid in regards to religious knowledge as
well. In this sense, religious sciences, such as the interpretation of the
Koran, do not differ from rational sciences except in regards to the
subject matter handled.
B. The second problem Ibn Taymiyya addresses on an existential level
is the traditionally imagined opposition of truth (ḥaqīqa) and meta-
phor (majāz) in regards to the Koran. This topic is actually “the center
of his works and the theoretical pillar of his responses to kalām, mys-
ticism and especially philosophy”. This occurs, again, on two levels:
- On the first level, Ibn Taymiyya rejects the opposition of truth
and metaphor as a later invention, baseless and unknown as it was to
the early great authorities of philology, tafsīr and uṣūl al-fiqh. - On the second level, Ibn Taymiyya rejects the concept of interpre-
tation which “determines the truth of that what an issue, in itself or in
its reference, results in”^176 , without taking into account the capability
176 Al-Marzūqī, Fikr Ibn Taymiyya al-iṣlāḥī, http://www.alfalsafa.com/fikr ibn
taymia.html, accessed on August 16, 2011.
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