Divine Wisdom, Human Agency and the fiṭra in Ibn Taymiyya’s Thought 39
order to act, or as being incomplete without the cause. Moreover, the
Ashʿarīs assume that the view of causation in divine actions would also
turn the act of creation into a rotation within a vicious circle without
end.^4 The Muʿtazilīs, however, see this cautious approach as unneces-
sary and worry that such arguments would leave God’s actions aimless
with no explanation. For them causation does not bring any limitation
to God’s attributes, provided that the causes are not necessary.^5
In January 1315, Ibn Taymiyya was asked whether God consid-
ers any cause or purpose in His creation and, if so, whether the cause
would become pre-eternal or not; or, if not, whether this means He is
occupied with absurdity. These conditions highlight the complex, mul-
tifaceted nature of the issue. Ibn Taymiyya explains his position, taking
a middle way between the positions of the Ashʿarīs and Muʿtazilīs.^6
In his response, Ibn Taymiyya points out the comprehensive charac-
ter of the issue since it is related to divine actions, attributes, names, and
principles, and reminds us that it has become one of the most debat-
ed topics. Following a summary of the views of various schools, Ibn
Taymiyya criticizes both philosophers and theologians for using the
wrong or deficient arguments. In his view, acknowledging causes and
aims in God’s actions results neither in the pre-eternity of the cause,
nor in the limitation of His authority. Because God’s actions are related
to the universe and the created beings, therefore their causes can only
be created. The pre-eternity of such causes is not imaginable for Ibn
Taymiyya, since they are generated and employed through God’s will.
If the causes had an eternal nature, there would not be any origination
or creation in the physical existence.^7
4 For the Ashʿarī view of divine wisdom, see al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr: Tamhīd
al-awāʾil wa-talkhīṣ al-dalāʾil, edited by ʿImād al-Dīn Aḥmad Ḥaydar, Beirut
1987, pp. 50–52; al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn: Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn, edited
by Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā, Cairo 1986, vol. 1, pp. 350–354; al-Taftazānī, Saʿd
al-Dīn: Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra, Beirut 1989,
vol. 4, pp. 301–302.
5 For the Muʿtazilī view, see Ibn Mattawayh, Abū Muḥammad Ḥasan b. Aḥmad:
al-Majmūʿ fī al-Muḥīṭ bil-taklīf, edited by Jean Joseph Houben and Daniel
Gimaret, Beirut 1986, vol. 2, pp. 179–180.
6 Ibn Taymiyya, Taqī al-Dīn: Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil wal-masāʾil, edited by
Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Beirut 1983, vol. 5, p. 285; Ibn Taymiyya, Taqī al-Dīn:
Majmūʿ Fatāwā, edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Qāsim al-ʿĀṣimī
al-Najdī, Riyadh 1991, vol. 8, p. 81.
7 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil wal-masāʾil, vol. 5, pp. 286–290; Ibn Taymiy-
ya, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, vol. 8, pp. 82–85, 377–381.
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