Divine Wisdom, Human Agency and the fiṭra in Ibn Taymiyya’s Thought 43
activities of humans (al-irāda al-dīniyya al-amriyya). There is a differ-
ence between these two aspects of divine will, due to the involvement
of human responsibility in the latter one.^18 He therefore criticizes the
Ashʿarīs for not paying attention to this crucial difference and for tend-
ing toward determination in human actions, almost like the Jabrīs. The
Ashʿarī view, he argues, does not propose any proper role for human
beings in producing actions at some point in their life.^19
However, Ibn Taymiyya thinks, that it would be impossible to prac-
tice any religious obligation without freedom of action or a free will to
act. If human will was not vital in the occurrence of actions, God would
not ask individuals to perform according to their capacity, and no dif-
ference would be seen between moral and immoral people.^20 Defin-
ing the actions as acquisitions of humans, Ibn Taymiyya emphasizes,
would limit the power and capacity of humans and would not offer
any reason to distinguish between acquiring and doing an action.^21 The
ambiguity of the Ashʿarīs about such a difference implies a kind of
inclination toward determination in human actions. Moreover, he says,
it gives individuals only a symbolic role in their activities, as a result of
lacking sufficient authority in their decisions.^22
With this eclectic approach, Ibn Taymiyya accepts humans’ own-
ership of their actions without denying God’s eventual creation and
without falling into complex theories, such as of the theory of acquisi-
tion. For instance, while he refers to God’s creation, he also describes
humans as originators (muḥdith) of their actions, a term that Sunni
theologians often avoided using. The Koran, he says, refers in many
verses to various actions directly attributed to humans, and the Muslim
community has no doubt about their being the real – not the meta-
phoric – doers of their actions.^23 Therefore, in Ibn Taymiyya’s theory,
humans are naturally free in their acts, for God does not force them to
do things. Even if they are constrained by other individuals or groups,
humans are essentially qualified with free will and under normal cir-
18 Ibn Taymiyya, Taqī al-Dīn: Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil al-kubrā, Cairo 1323/1905–06,
vol. 2, pp. 69–71.
19 Idem, Minhāj al-sunna, vol. 1, pp. 397–398.
20 Idem, Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil al-kubrā, vol. 1, p. 361. See also Rahman, Islam,
p. 114.
21 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, vol. 8, pp. 118–119; Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat
al-Rasāʾil wal-masāʾil, vol. 5, pp. 315–316.
22 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, vol. 8, p. 467; Ibn Taymiyya, Kitāb al-Nu-
buw wāt, p. 206.
23 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, vol. 8, pp. 459–460.
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