82 Livnat Holtzman
Another fundamental assumption of the Jabrī is the impossibility of
an infinite regress.^71 While this premise does not require any proof, the
premise on the necessity of human actions is thoroughly examined by
the Jabrī. These two premises combined are the axis of the Jabrī’s set of
argumentations for jabr:
We say: when the human power and motivation are obtained, the origina-
tion of the action is either necessary or not. If it is necessary, then human
action is necessitated (iḍṭirārī). That is the essence of jabr, because human
power and motivation are not originated from the human agent. Were
they so, it would have entailed an infinite regress (tasalsul), which is quite
obvious. Since that is the case, when both of them [i. e. the human pow-
er and the motivation] are obtained, the human act becomes necessary
(wājib). When both of them are not obtained, the human act becomes
impossible (mumtaniʿ). Thus, jabr is by all means necessary.^72The necessity of the human act, then, leads the Jabrī once more to assert
his belief in jabr. But since he is forced to examine this concept through-
out the dialogue, the Jabrī focuses his argument for the necessity of the
human act on the motive (dāʿī) of the human act. The motive, claims the
Jabrī, is the cause of human action (sabab al-fiʿl), and is created by God.^73
Elsewhere he uses an equivalent term, the preponderator (murajjiḥ).
This inconsistent use of both terms in the discourse of the Jabrī is
by all means rooted in the works of al-Rāzī himself.^74 The Jabrī seems
to use both terms in the same manner: as a major factor which accom-
panies the human power (qudra), and eventually leads towards the
production of human action. Following al-Rāzī, the Jabrī defines the
motive to act as knowledge:
been the creator of his actions, he would have been the creator of every existent.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, p. 337; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ
al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 149.
71 Central to kalāmic argumentation, the impossibility of an infinite regress is
employed by Islamic theologians and philosophers in discussions which argue
against the eternity of the world. Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, pp. 77–81.
For the basic argument in Plato, see Bradely, Raymond D.: Infinite regress argu-
ment, in: Robert Audi (ed.): The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cam-
bridge 1996, pp. 429–430.
72 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, p. 319; Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 140. See
al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 2, p. 225; al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 13–14;
Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics, p. 29.
73 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, p. 324; Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 143. See
al-Rāzī, Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn, p. 225.
74 Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics, pp. 20–22.
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