Debating the Doctrine of jabr (Compulsion) 85
nem), which, he declares, he adopted from al-Rāzī. He even gives a
fairly accurate citation of that argument from al-Rāzī.^84
It is through his detailed discussion on the human motivation that the
Sunni unfolds his doctrine. At first, the Sunni says, he agrees with the
Jabrī that the motive (dāʿī) of human action is the cause of the human act
(sabab al-fiʿl), and is created by God.^85 However, soon enough he clarifies
that the motive is not the efficient cause (muʾaththir) of the action, nor the
only cause (sabab) of the action, although at the beginning of his response
he agrees with the Jabrī on this issue. The Sunni sees the motive, like other
factors connected to human action, as a condition (sharṭ) or a part of a
cause (juzʾ sabab) of the action.^86 Reducing the status of the motive from
the cause of the action to a partial cause is meant to elevate the weight
of human power, human will and more so, human choice in the perfor-
mance of the human act.^87 According to the Sunni, many factors beyond
human control are parts of the cause of action. The fact that all causes are
created by God does not mean that the human being is not the agent of
his action. In the beginning of his response, the Sunni clarifies this view:
The motive is created by God in the human being, and it is the cause of
action. The action is attributed to its [human] agent, since it was origi-
nated from him, and occurred through his power, will and choice. That
does not prevent the action from being attributed in general (bi-ṭarīq
al-ʿumūm) to Him, the Creator and Almighty.^88He concludes:
The power of the human being, his will and motives are but one part of
the many parts of the complete cause (sabab tāmm), which necessitates
the act [...]. Whoever claims that the human being has no effect, some
way or the other, on the action, that the existence of his power and will is
the same as their inexistence, as far as the action is concerned, arrives at a
conclusion which contradicts reason and the senses.^8984 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, p. 320; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ
al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 141. See al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, p. 15.
85 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, p. 324; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ
al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 143. See al-Rāzī, Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn, p. 225.
86 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, pp. 324–325; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya,
Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 143. See al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, p. 257.
87 For the use of the term ikhtiyār (choice) in Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, see Holtzman, Human
Choice, p. 181.
88 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, p. 324; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ
al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 143.
89 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, p. 325; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ
al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 143. The part omitted here is a refutation of the Muʿtazilī per-
ception on the efficacy of the human power.
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