Conclusions 175all stand to gain from the Western understanding of secularism in vary-
ing measures. Any problematization of this Western secularism triggers a
knee-jerk reaction among many as if there was only one alternative. Their
fears of religious nationalism immediately push their mind-set, despite all
their civilizational endowments, back to the colonial days. The "rational,
objective, scientific, secular" West feels surrounded by "irrational, subjec-
tive, unscientific and religious barbarians."^9 It is this Western colonial atti-
tude—among other things, such as the lack of results from the neocolonial
socio-economic-political arrangement and institutions, economic disap-
pointments, social frustrations, and political confusion—that gives rise to
resentment among the peoples of the Third World and makes them turn
inwardly to search for results. When they do turn inward, the Western
theory of "beauty and the beasts" stands vindicated. The cycle continues
and will most probably continue forever until the self-righteous "beauty"
and the vindictive "beasts" change their mind-sets.
This is not to imply that religious nationalism of the Hindutva type is
an answer for the quandary. Instead, what is attempted here is to explore
whether all non-Western modernities should or could adopt Western secu-
larism, and whether there are no other ways of combining religion and
politics. Louise Dumont's argument provides the point of departure here:
"Communalism, on the one hand, differs from nationalism in the place that
religion seems to play in it, while on the other, the religious element that
enters into its composition seems to be but the shadow of religion—that is,
religion taken not as the essence and guide of life in all spheres, but only
as a sign of the distinction of one human, at least virtually political, group
against others."^10 Dumont's contention makes so much sense in a multire-
ligious country such as India.
The Hindutva communal nationalism in India has a significant religious
component. The "deride and rule" policy of the Hindu orthodoxy directed
toward the lower castes has been the foundational principle in Hinduism
and has never helped to bring about any kind of social justice or solidar-
ity among the various sections of Hindus. The strict hierarchy, status-
consciousness, negation of any dialogue or reformation, and overall reac-
tionary backwardness in thinking and disposition gave rise to a political
culture of that order with internal rivalries and petty quarrels. That inher-
ent weakness only facilitated the invasions and overruns. Even today's
insincere solidarity rhetoric glosses over the fundamental issues involved,
such as Brahminical supremacy or caste oppression, and this shallow exer-
cise tries to buy time to achieve two things: to trick the "lower" Hindus
into the old trap and to put the non-Hindus in their place. If and when the
non-Hindus are subdued, the "lower" Hindus will be targeted.
So Hindu nationalism is not just religious nationalism but also a casteist
nationalism. It is an inferiority complex fueled by the historic defeats of
the Hindu elites and fanned by their desperate attempts of making up for