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The poem vividly illustrates the critical significance of perspective for observa-
tion. According to the poet, the very interiority of the location makes it impossible
for us to know the “true face of Mount Lu.” We do not know the “true face of Mount
Lu” because what we see constantly changes as we move high or low, far off, or up
close. Such a circularity or subjectivity of our understanding urges us to become
conscious of the challenge. It demonstrates how perspectives influence how we see
and interpret the world. It also implies how difficult to overcome the limitation of
our own perspectives. A perspective is usually defined as an ingrained way of per-
ceiving the world. Simply put, it is the way that one looks at something. Its closely
related term frame of reference refers to a complex set of assumptions and attitudes
which we use to filter perceptions to create meaning. The frame can include beliefs,
schemas, preferences, values, culture, and other ways in which we bias our under-
standing and judgment. It is a set of ideas, as of philosophical or religious doctrine,
in terms of which other ideas are interpreted or assigned meaning.
Some people, such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Edmund Husserl, use the term
horizon, which was further developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer ( 1975 ) into a cru-
cial term for understanding the very nature of understanding: “The horizon is the
range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage
point” (p.302). Since and to some extent because of them, the term has been used
more to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy and
the way one’s range of vision is gradually expanded. Every (social) researcher has
her/his particular horizon or vantage point from which she/he sees and understands
things, and what she/he sees must be within the range of her/his vision, tied to her/
his finite determinacy. Thus horizon constitutes the precondition of understanding
or what Heidegger ( 1962 ) called the fore-structure of understanding. Before people
understand anything, they already have some idea about that which they are about
to understand, that is, their anticipations or prejudgments, and the process of under-
standing appears to move in a hermeneutic circle. For instance, when observing
East Asian higher education, a Western scholar would understand it from the hori-
zon and perspective of a Westerner.
The hermeneutic circle does not legitimize the subjectivity of one’s own hori-
zon. As Gadamer ( 1975 ) points out, all correct interpretation must be on guard
against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of
thought, with one’s gaze always directed on the things themselves (p.267). What it
does is to remind us of the significance of perspective and frame of reference in the
social sciences. Issues of perspective are particularly relevant in comparative his-
torical analysis which has a long and distinguished history in social research. Major
figures in the formation of modern social science, including Adam Smith, Alexis de
Tocqueville, Karl Marx, and Max Weber, all pursued comparative historical analy-
sis as a central mode of investigation. Offering historically grounded explanations,
this research method appeals most to sociologists, political scientists, historians,
and anthropologists interested in tracing the development of social forms and insti-
tutions and comparing these processes across cultures. The scholarly tradition has
dominated social thought for centuries, with a dramatic reemergence over recent
decades. Thus, comparative historical inquiry is increasingly visible in the
R. Ya ng