Bovine tuberculosis

Managing Bovine Tuberculosis: Successes and Issues 229

iterative effects on finalized strategic objectives
and costs (Livingstone et al., 2015b).

15.2.9 Agreement on funding

Gaining agreement as to who is responsible for
funding a TB strategy is a major challenge for a
sustained programme with a long time frame.
Ideally, costs should be allocated to funders in
proportion to the value of the benefits they
receive. In practice this can be difficult to ascer-
tain, the benefit proportions may change over
time, and mechanisms to collect funds from cer-
tain beneficiaries may be cumbersome, avoid-
able or unavailable.
Regardless of the basis of apportioning
funding, the method used needs to be transpar-
ent and agreed to by all funders. It should be
seen to be fair and logical as well as simple and
cost effective to implement. Where TB infection
may affect export of cattle-derived products,
export income may provide a means for allocat-
ing funding shares between export sectors such
as dairy and beef industries. Where the benefit
from a TB programme is an increase in animal or
herd production, then individual farmers, or col-
lectives representing them, should fund at least
part of the programme directly, such as paying
for certain TB tests or receiving reduced com-
pensation for slaughter of test-positive cattle.
National or local government funding may
be required in place of, or to augment, more tar-
geted industry or stakeholder funding in situa-
tions where the latter beneficiaries are difficult to
identify or raise funds from. Government fund-
ing may also be more secure, especially in the
late stages of a programme when low disease
incidence may lead farmers or industry to
severely reduce TB programme expenditure.
This ensures that when a programme is well
advanced and immediate disease risks to indus-
try stakeholders and farmers are minimal, gov-
ernment funding may enable the programme to
be maintained to its desired conclusion. This
protects against re-establishment of widespread
infection which may occur if resources were
withdrawn during the long end-phase of an
eradication programme. Ideally, funding shares
and mechanisms should be set out in legislation,
based on negotiated agreements between

funders. A range of funding options have been

used, from total government funding (Enticott,

2014) to a mix of farmer/industry/government

shares (Cousins and Roberts, 2001; Max et al.,

2011; Livingstone et al., 2015a).

15.2.10 Programme policies

Given funding constraints, programme policies

should be based on a mix of best technical

knowledge and the practicality of applying dis-

ease control interventions across affected herds

and areas, such that milestones and objectives

will be met. Policies need to be clearly enunci-

ated, unambiguous and compliant with legisla-

tion. They also need to meet the requirements of

trading partners and as far as possible, farmer

and stakeholder needs.

It is important that disease control policies

take account of farming, industry and societal

contexts. For example, when farmers have poor

understanding of the disease and its control,

they may mistrust what they see to be imposed

control programmes. In particular, farmers may

have concerns over the accuracy of TB tests, the

impacts of reactor slaughter, adequacy of com-

pensation and the effects of possible animal

movement restrictions, all of which can reduce

farming incomes. These concerns need to be

identified and addressed through communica-

tion and consultation (see section 15.2.11), or

otherwise they may lead to lack of compliance.

Funding arrangements and disease control

policies that may impose costs or constraints on

farmers need to be seen as fair in relation to ben-

efits and cost. Policy impacts on different farm-

ing types need to be recognized and possibly

ameliorated – for example, policies that con-

strain livestock movement may have little impact

on farms that finish beef cattle for slaughter, but

may be drastic for stock breeders reliant on live

animal sales. Compensation payments can ease

the impacts of necessarily restrictive disease

control policies, but care must be taken to avoid

perverse outcomes or wasted spending from

overly generous compensation.

Mistrust or perception of unfairness can

significantly affect programme acceptance by

farmers, farming organizations, politicians and

the general public (Moda, 2006; Palmer and