The Economist Asia Edition – July 27, 2019

24 China The EconomistJuly 27th 2019

2 form. Neither demand is likely to be heed-

ed. The central government has expressed

strong support for Mrs Lam and none what-

ever for real political change. Her adminis-

tration cannot negotiate with the protes-

ters. It seems paralysed in the face of them.

Meanwhile, the demonstrators them-

selves are moving beyond the reach of out-

side influences. Older reformers such as

Martin Lee, who once held considerable

sway over the territory’s democratic move-

ments, say they can do little. Even the

younger activists who led the “Umbrella

Movement” of 2014 say they have become

peripheral. A group of local ngos, called

the Civil Human Rights Front, has been be-

hind recent marches that have obtained

police permission. But these are often fol-

lowed by smaller protests by young radi-

cals, such as those who gathered outside

the central government’s office.

The Water Margin

These unauthorised protests appear lead-

erless. Participants keep their faces cov-

ered, hide behind umbrellas when making

plans and use encrypted messaging-ser-

vices. They come with changes of clothes to

avoid detection after they disperse, and gas

masks against tear gas (which the police

used, along with rubber bullets, on July

21st). Such anonymity makes them hard to

control—or to negotiate with. They quote

Bruce Lee, a kung-fu actor: “Be formless,

shapeless, like water.”

Despite the occasional violence, the

radicals appear to enjoy considerable sym-

pathy among moderate protesters. Within

the crowds, groups of Christian pastors

lead hymn-singing and offer spiritual

guidance. Social workers and legislators

often insert themselves between protes-

ters and police in an attempt to mediate.

There is less unity on the other side. On

July 20th the party’s sympathisers organ-

ised their own rally. But one prominent

participant, Arthur Shek, a director of a

group that controls a pro-party newspaper,

resigned from the board of the group on

July 23rd after calling for violent anti-gov-

ernment protesters to be caned. Members

of his own staff said his remarks had incit-

ed the attackers in Yuen Long.

The Hong Kong General Chamber of

Commerce, which normally backs the au-

thorities, condemned the violence both at

the central government’s office and in

Yuen Long. But it went further, in effect

calling on the government to make conces-

sions. Echoing one of the protesters’ de-

mands, it said there should be an indepen-

dent inquiry into the unrest. So far the

government has been deaf to such ideas. It

seems to want to wait, hoping the protes-

ters will tire of their action. If anything, the

opposite is happening. They have called a

march in Yuen Long on July 27th to protest

against the beatings there. 7

F

or the pastthree years China’s govern-

ment, citing national-security con-

cerns, has run relentless campaigns

against the culture and religion of the Ui-

ghur people, 11m Muslims who speak a

Turkic language and live in Xinjiang, Chi-

na’s north-westernmost corner. Mosques

have been shut. Men are forbidden to grow

beards, women may not wear head cover-

ings and children are barred from prayers.

Most troubling are the growing details

emerging about a network of detention fa-

cilities, which Chinese officials call voca-

tional-training centres but which look for

all the world like internment camps. Cred-

ible reports say these are holding at least 1m

people—mostly Uighurs but also Chinese

people of Kazakh and Kyrgyz ethnicity—in

extra-judicial detention.

Until the middle of 2018, Chinese dip-

lomats managed to keep international crit-

icism of the camps in check. At that point

America’s vice-president, Mike Pence,

raised concerns about “round-the-clock

political indoctrination”. Since then, the

Chinese have lost their battle to persuade

foreign countries that Xinjiang is purely an

internal matter, of no concern to anyone

else. But they have turned it into an issue

that polarises diplomatic opinion. That po-

larisation has now burst into the open.

On July 8th, 22 countries signed a letter

to the un Human Rights Council, calling

on China to end the “mass arbitrary deten-

tion” of Uighurs and other Muslims, and to

allow international observers access to de-

tention camps. This was the first concerted

international condemnation of Chinese

actions in Xinjiang. Signatories included

most European countries, Canada, Japan

and Australia but not the United States (see

map), which withdrew from the council in

2018. However, Mike Pompeo, the secretary
      of state, later called China’s treatment of
      the Uighurs “the stain of the century”.
      Days later, 37 countries, among them
      Russia and Saudi Arabia, responded with a
      letter of their own, defending China’s poli-
      cies on the grounds of fighting terrorism.
      Some signatories were anti-Western autoc-
      racies which can be relied upon to rally
      round anyone that the West criticises. They
      include Russia and Venezuela. Other signa-
      tories are Western allies, such as Egypt and
      Saudi Arabia, which oppose what might be
      called the global human-rights regime.
      They lock up plenty of their own oppo-
      nents on security grounds. Still others are
      beneficiaries of Chinese investment, such
      as Pakistan and Laos, which cannot easily
      afford to bite the hand that feeds them.
      Most intriguing, however are Gulf
      states which back China for a combination
      of defence, economic and even religious
      reasons. The United Arab Emirates, for ex-
      ample, cannot get the drones it wants from
      America, so is buying China’s Wing Loong 2
      drones. (Its de facto ruler was in Beijing
      this week.) It signed the letter, along with 19
      other members of the Organisation of Is-
      lamic Co-operation, an international
      group of mostly Muslim-majority states. In
      2018 China signed construction and invest-
      ment contracts worth $28bn in the Middle
      East, a region that is struggling to attract
      foreign investment elsewhere. And some
      Gulf states, such as the uae and Saudi Ara-
      bia, are trying to fight jihadist extremism at
      home by encouraging more modern forms
      of Islam. They seem receptive to China’s
      claim that it is merely attempting to mo-
      dernise Uighur beliefs (though in reality
      Chinese actions go far beyond that).
      China’s attempt to divide international
      opinion about Xinjiang has worked so far.
      But, as more details leak out about the re-
      gion’s camps, Muslim leaders are begin-
      ning to come under domestic pressure to
      defend their co-religionists. One day, they
      may find it harder to kowtow. 7

Not even Muslim states are willing to

stand up for the Uighurs

Xinjiang and international reactions

With friends like

these

Source: The Economist

WhocaresabouttheUighurs?

Xinjiang CHINA

International response to

Chinese actions in Xinjiang

July 2019

Member of the

Organisation of

Islamic Co-operation

Condemning China

22 countries

Supporting China

37 countries