The Economist Asia Edition – July 27, 2019

The EconomistJuly 27th 2019 Middle East & Africa 35

2 First came theSidama, who number
around5mandarethebiggestgroupinthe
statecalledtheSouthernNations,Nation-
alitiesandPeoples’Region(snnpr).They
havelongedchafedattheirinclusioninthe
snnpr, a messyhotch-potchofmorethan
45 differentethnicgroups.Othersarealso
unhappywiththeset-up.Groupsthatlive
farfromHawassa,thestatecapital,have
lesssaythanthose,suchastheSidama,
thatdominatethecentre.Thestategovern-
ment is weakand fractious; parliament
failedtopassa budgetthisyear.Sincethe
Sidamarequesteda referendumlastJulyat

leasttenothergroupshavedemandedtheir

ownstates.

Balkanisationalongethniclinesisdan-

gerous.Lastyearintercommunalfighting

forcedalmost3mpeoplefromtheirhomes.

Muchoftheviolenceoccurredinthecoun-

try’sdenselypopulatedsouth.Aprolifera-

tionofnewstatesequippedwiththeirown

securityforcesmaybea recipeforfurther

bloodshedif,asseemslikely,thereareter-

ritorialdisputes.Minoritygroupsfearbe-

ing persecuted.States, which can write

theirownconstitutions,haveoftenfailed

toprotectthem.SomeSidamaleaderssay

theirconstitutionwillbemoreinclusive

thanmostandtheypromisequotasformi-

noritiesingovernment.Butotherleaders

arelesskeenonsuchmeasures.

Abiyhasdonelittletocalmnerves.For

monthshisgovernmentditheredinstead

oforganisingthereferendumfortheSi-

dama.Thenhethreatenedtouseforceif

thegroupdeclaredindependenceunilater-

ally.Activistssaytheydonottrustthegov-

ernmenttokeepitsnewpromiseofa refer-

endum.“It’splayingtricks,”saysGosaye.

MeanwhiletheWelayta,thesecond-largest

ethnicgroupinthesnnpr, havetakento

thestreetsdemandingtheirownvoteon

statehood. Ethiopia’s southern problem

maygetworsebeforeit getsbetter. 7

SOMALIA

SOUTH

SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

UGANDA KENYA

SUDAN

DJIBOUTI

ERITREA

Red

Sea

AddisAbaba

Hawassa

SNNPR Sidama

300 km

C

yril ramaphosa is an avid cattle

breeder. He once bought a herd of An-

kole longhorns from Uganda’s leader, Yow-

eri Museveni. But South Africa’s president

must feel that he has rarely dealt with so

much bull as he has in recent weeks.

On July 19th the public protector, an om-

budsman, accused Mr Ramaphosa of vio-

lating the constitution by deliberately mis-

leading parliament. This is a grave

allegation. If true it would obliterate the

president’s claim to have ushered in a “new

dawn” following the kleptocratic rule of his

predecessor, Jacob Zuma, in 2009-18.

There is both less and more to the case

than first appears. Less in that the public

protector’s arguments are flimsy. More in

that they can be seen as part of a broad as-

sault by Mr Ramaphosa’s enemies.

The case dates back to November. In

parliament Mmusi Maimane, the leader of

the opposition Democratic Alliance, bran-

dished what he said was proof of a payment

of 500,000 rand ($36,000) from the boss of

Africa Global Operations (ago, previously

known as Bosasa), a company accused of

graft, to Andile Ramaphosa, the president’s

eldest son. Mr Maimane asked the presi-

dent to “set the record straight”.

The president could have gone away

and checked the facts. But he did not. Mr

Ramaphosa said that he knew about the

matter: he had spoken to his son, who runs

a consultancy, and who had insisted that

the money was for legitimate work. If it

proved otherwise, the president went on,

he would take Andile to the police himself.

Both Mr Maimane’s question and Mr Ra-

maphosa’s answer were based on a flawed

premise. Andile had done work for agobut

this payment was to CR17, the president’s

campaign to replace Mr Zuma as head of

the ruling African National Congress

(anc). According to a sworn affidavit Mr

Ramaphosa did not learn of the donation

until an aide told him after he had left the

chamber; the president had asked to be

kept in the dark about donors, so as to avoid

potential conflicts of interest. Mr Rama-

phosa then wrote to parliament correcting

whatheseesasanhonestmistake.

South African campaign-finance laws

are opaque. It reflects badly on the presi-

dent that his team took money from ago.

And it would be naive to think that Andile’s

surname did not help him get jobs.

But the report from Busisiwe Mkhwe-

bane, the public protector (pictured), con-

tains no concrete evidence that the presi-

dent “deliberately” misled parliament, as

she claims. Indeed, Ms Mkhwebane para-

doxically states that the president acted in

“good faith”. Pierre de Vos, a law professor,

calls the report “a legal and factual mess”.

Mr Ramaphosa is seeking a judicial review.

It is not the first display of the public

protector’s incompetence. Courts have tak-

en issue with Ms Mkhwebane since she as-

sumed office in 2016. Most recently, on July

22nd, South Africa’s highest court found

that she had lied under oath and acted in

bad faith in a case involving the central

bank. Ms Mkhwebane also has a record of

(ineptly) going after Mr Ramaphosa’s allies

while being soft on his enemies.

The public protector is not the only

source of woe for Mr Ramaphosa. Mr Zuma

and his henchman, Ace Magashule, the

anc’s secretary-general, who is also ac-

cused of corruption, want to see the back of

a president who is trying to clean up the

government. Mr Zuma, in particular, may

be hoping that having an ally as president

might shield him from prosecution on

charges relating to 783 counts of fraud,

money-laundering and racketeering.

South Africa’s gdpcontracted by 3.2% in

the first quarter of the year. The more the

president is distracted by internal oppo-

nents, the less time he has to try to fix the

country’s pressing problems. His record

continues to be one of overpromising and

underdelivering—which is, of course, ex-

actly what his enemies want. 7

JOHANNESBURG

The president’s enemies are undermining his administration

South African politics

Ramaphosa under siege

Protecting the public?