The Economist June 11th 2022 Leaders 13
The bill for rebuilding Ukraine’s smashed citiesandrepairing
its ruined industrial base will be huge: upwardsof$600bn,ac
cording to some estimates (see Finance & economicssection).
That has got many people wondering if the Westshouldshift
from merely freezing Russian assets temporarilytoconfiscating
them permanently. They could then be used to payfortherecon
struction that lies ahead.
Russia has about $300bn of reserves held in theWestandup
to another $1trn of mainly privatesector assets heldabroad.On
May 19th Ursula von der Leyen, the president oftheEuropean
Commission, said that the eu was looking intoassetseizures.
The g7 has discussed using them, too.
The idea that the aggressor should pay for
the damage it has caused is appealing and pop
ular. But the legal justification, and strategic
logic, of sanctions are that they impair a coun
try’s capability to pursue a course of action and
may change its behaviour, because if that coun
try alters its path the assets will be released. A
shift from this approach to a policy of perma
nent seizure would be a big step that would be justifiable only if
two tests are passed. The first is that any new policy is compati
ble with the rule of law. And the second is that it has a clear stra
tegic payoff.
Start with the rule of law. In America the president has the au
thority to freeze a foreign government’s assets but not typically
to seize them unless America is at war with that country. Ever
since Russia invaded Ukraine, President Joe Biden has been at
pains to say America is not in open conflict with it. The execu
tive branch can transfer control over certain foreign assets when
it stops recognising a country’s government, as with some funds
thatbelongtoVenezuelaandAfghanistan(seeAsiasection).
However,Americasaysit doesnotseekregimechangeinRussia.
Underinternationallaw,reparationsusuallyinvolvethecon
sentofthepayingcountry,typicallyaspartofa peacetreaty.
Suchnegotiationsarea longwayoff,andUkrainemustnotbe
forcedintothem.Seizingassetsownedbyindividuals,however
odioustheyare,beforetheyhavebeenconvictedbya courtisal
sodubious.Insomecountries,suchasGermany,doingsomay
violatetheconstitution.
WhatabouttheWest’sstrategicinterests?Intheshortrun,
permanentseizurewouldmakenodifferencetotheKremlin’s
abilitytofunditsdeadlywarmachine,sinceMr
Putin’sregime cannotuse theforeignassets
thathavealreadybeensanctionedandfrozen.
Inthelongrun,theprecedentsetbyconfisca
tionswithouta clearlegalfootingwouldexpose
all crossborder assets, including Western
ones, to titfortat appropriation by govern
ments.Itwouldalsogivea furtherincentivefor
countriesthatarenotalliedwithAmerica,or
which have unstable relations with it, to bypass the American
led financial system, which is a bedrock of Western power.
Rather than resorting to asset confiscations, the West must
strengthen Ukraine’s war effort. That means supplying more
heavy weapons and speeding up their deployment and the train
ing of Ukrainian forces to use them (see Europe section). It
means maintaining sanctions for as long as Russia wages its war
and occupies Ukraine. And it means making clear that even if no
peace deal is signed, and no Russian reparations are ever paid,
Europe and America will still have to foota largepart of the bill
for rebuilding Ukraine’s shattered economy.n
Russia, central-bank reserves
Foreign currency and gold, by location
January 1st 222, % of total
France
Germany
China
GoldinRussia
50 201510
Not under sanctions
Under sanctions
I
n 1995, ayear after becoming South Africa’s first black pres
ident, Nelson Mandela gave a speech in Alexandra, a township
in Johannesburg. “It saddens and angers me to see the rising hat
red of foreigners,” he said, chastising residents for destroying
migrants’ homes. “We cannot blame other people for our troub
les.” Under Mandela, the African National Congress (anc), many
of whose fugitive leaders had been sheltered by other African
countries during apartheid, took in Africans fleeing wars in
Congo, Somalia and elsewhere. The new government also made
it easier for Africans to work and settle in South Africa.
They have not always felt welcome. Xenophobic locals occa
sionally attacked immigrants in the 1990s in poor urban areas
like Alexandra, and there was more widespread violence against
foreigners in 2008. In general, however, South African politi
cians have refrained from inciting such horrors. Unfortunately,
that is changing. Today politicians from several parties are vying
to see who can blame immigrants most loudly for the country’s
selfinflicted problems (see Middle East & Africa section). The
virulence of their rhetoric varies, but the consequence is the
same: life for immigrants has grown nastier and more perilous.
Vigilante groups are growing in strength. They spread wild
rumours on social media. They stomp around townships, de
manding (illegally) to check foreigners’ identity documents.
Sometimes, they inflict mob justice. Astonishingly, one in eight
South Africans say they have taken part in “violent action”
against immigrants; almost as many say they would be prepared
to do so. Most South Africans think migrants commit more
crimes (they don’t) and “steal” local jobs (studies suggest that
they tend to boost both gdpand employment).
Instead of rebutting these baseless beliefs, political entrepre
neurs seek to exploit them. Actionsa, a new rightwing populist
party; the Economic Freedom Fighters, a hardleft outfit; and
ethnicitybased parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party and
the Patriotic Alliance, all fan fear of foreigners to woo votes away
from the anc, which is expected to lose its majority in the next
election in 2024.
Anxious to cling to power, the ruling party has responded by
treating foreigners more harshly. The processing of asylum ap
plications has ground to a halt. Some provinces want to restrict
foreign ownership of township shops. A new immigration sys
tem promises to make it harder for firms to hire noncitizens.
And the government says it will no longer renew residence per
mits used by many Zimbabweans since the ruin of their country
in the late 2000s. Before long, they will face a grim choice: live in
South Africans should not blame immigrants for their country’s failings
Scapegoating Africans
Xenophobia in South Africa