The Economist June 11th 2022 69
Finance & economics
Economicwarfare
Seizing opportunities
I
n 2011 viktor vekselberg, a metals ty
coon and Kremlin insider, visited the
team designing the Tango, a $90m yacht he
had ordered, to oversee its construction.
His attention to detail proved his undoing.
When Mr Vekselberg came under Ameri
can sanctions in 2018, his foreign assets
were frozen—but not the Tango, which was
held via a shell company registered in the
British Virgin Islands. Then two engineers
at the shipyard, remembering the meeting
in 2011, tipped off the fbi. A trail of money
transfers confirmed that Mr Vekselberg did
indeed own the Tango. On April 4th this
year Spanish police, acting at America’s re
quest, seized the boat in Mallorca.
Netting the Tango was a coup for
KleptoCapture, a task force set up by Joe Bi
den, America’s president, to track the as
sets of oligarchs blacklisted by the West
after Russia invaded Ukraine. The euhas
captured about $7bn in art, boats and prop
erty; Italy has impounded a $700m super
yacht said to be linked to Vladimir Putin;
America has held about $1bn in vessels and
aircraft. Add in the chunk of the Russian
central bank’s currency reserves that have
come under Western sanctions, and nearly
$400bn in assets have been blocked.
According to the Kyiv School of Eco
nomics, the total economic damage to Uk
raine so far could amount to as much as
$600bn. To many, therefore, the idea of
seizing Russian assets, selling them and
using the proceeds to compensate the vic
tims of Mr Putin’s aggression seems irre
sistible. Charles Michel, the head of the
European Council, for instance, has argued
that “it is extremely important not only to
freeze assets, but also to make it possible to
confiscate them, to make them available
for rebuilding Ukraine.” The idea has
gained support from politicians every
where from Canada to Germany. But there
are two big obstacles to the plan: the practi
cal difficulties of freezing assets, and the
legal difficulties of seizing them.
Consider the practicalities of freezing
assets first. The central bank’s currency re
serves are a relatively straightforward tar
get. More than half of Russia’s reserves are
held in the West and are subject to sanc
tions. So far, however, this giant stash is
“hindered”, not technically frozen: tran
sactions with the central bank are prohib
ited, but its funds are not legally blocked.
That means Western countries are an extra
step away from being able to seize the
money, says Adam Smith of Gibson Dunn,
a law firm. Ukraine’s allies could decide to
take that step, as America did when it froze
the Afghan central bank’s reserves last
year, after the Taliban entered Kabul.
Private assets are harder to target. Rus
sia’s stock of foreign direct investment
amounts to some $500bn. But little of this
is subject to freezes, says Rachel Ziemba of
cnas, an American thinktank. One pro
blem is that it is hard to know where the in
vestment is based: its recorded location is
often Cyprus, but that tends to be only an
intermediate stop. Freezes have therefore
focused on individuals instead.
Here, too, tracking down assets is
tricky. Anders Aslund, a former adviser to
the Russian and Ukrainian governments,
A growing chorus is calling for Russian assets to be confiscated to help rebuild
Ukraine. Legal hurdles stand in the way
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