volatility was far from China, and China’s participation in globalfinancial gover-
nance was less supported by interests. In terms of capability, China’s domestic
financial sector was less developed, and China was relatively inexperienced and at a
relatively low level infinancial governance, thus it was also very difficult to
skillfully and knowledgeably participate in globalfinancial governance. China was
uninterested in and also less capable of participating in globalfinancial governance.
Given these reasons, China-EU cooperation before the financial crisis was
mainly characterized by the following aspect: the EU was dedicated to integrating
China into the existing international system led by developed economies and to
making China accept the rules of this system in order to bring benefits to its own
economicfinancial group. For example, this was the case for the RMB exchange
rate issue and the opening of the Chinesefinancial market. In response to such
action on the part of the EU, China did not respond with full rejection and resis-
tance, instead China took a positive, practical and constructive cooperative attitude,
and engaged in dialogues and exchanges with the EU according to its own interests.
Take RMB appreciation as an example: China basically had a relativelyflexible and
practical attitude towards the RMB exchange rate issue and enabled gradual
appreciation by means of minor adjustments. On this issue, external pressure played
a certain role; when pressure was relatively high, appreciation accelerated, but
external pressure never constituted a fundamental determining factor, and the pace
of the RMB exchange rate adjustment was always controllable and acceptable and
was based on overall considerations about the healthy development of foreign trade
and foreign exchange reserve value preservation and increase. Meanwhile, China
also constantly understood, studied and applied beneficial rules in globalfinancial
governance.
As the key moment in the evolution of the internationalfinancial pattern, the
globalfinancial crisis exerted a far-reaching impact on the roles of China and the
EU in globalfinancial governance. As two key players, China and the EU not only
adapted to the new environment, but they also reshaped the environment.
Traditionally, the EU played the role of a normative power in the international
governance pattern and coordinated various conflicts and confrontations in inter-
national affairs.^8 China was a latecomer that understood, studied, adapted to and
transformed itself through the existing rules. With respect to the setting offinancial
governance issues, China passively made replies and responses to them in many
cases. After thefinancial crisis occurred, the traditional internationalfinancial
system was subject to a tremendous impact, the US and Europeanfinancial sector
suffered great losses, incurring an impact on thefinancial sector in developing
countries. As the severest crisis since the Second World War, this globalfinancial
crisis unfolded to a considerably extensive scope and caused huge losses. The
financial operation mode and supervision rules of developed countries were uni-
versally questioned worldwide; for example, social movements such as Occupy
(^8) Professor Jörn-Carsten Gottwald:“China, Europe and Financial Governance”,http://www.sirpa.
fudan.edu.cn/s/56/main.htm.
150 X. Hou