Tecumseh Sherman would assess, pithily
but accurately, as “one damn blunder from
beginning to end.”
The blueprint for the Red River cam-
paign called for cooperative action between
20,000 Union soldiers of the XIII and XIX
Corps under Banks, a powerful flotilla of
ironclads, tinclads, wooden warships, and
transports mounting more than 200 guns
under the command of Admiral David
Dixon Porter (who had also expressed con-
cerns of his own about the potential suc-
cess of the operation). In addition, there
would be 10,000 soldiers of the XVI and
XVII Corps from the Army of the Ten-
nessee. These last forces, battle-tested vet-
erans under Brig. Gen. Andrew Jackson
Smith, were on loan for the Trans-Missis-
sippi operation and due back with Sher-
man in April to take part in the looming
Atlanta campaign. Banks was told that he
could also count on an additional 15,000
Union troops slated to march from Little
Rock under the command of Maj. Gen.
Frederick Steele and join in the effort to
capture Shreveport.
With such a powerful force marshaled
for the offensive, Banks’s optimism began
to rise. He believed that Confederate resis-
tance would be minimal leading up to the
actual assault on Shreveport and that the
entire operation could be accomplished in
about four weeks despite the complexity of
the plan. Moving north from the vicinity
of New Orleans, Banks would lead the
largest force to the railroad junction at
Brashear City. From there he would march
to Opelousas and then on to Alexandria to
rendezvous with Smith’s command and
Porter’s flotilla, numbering more than 60
boats. Smith and Porter, in the meantime,
would follow the Red River to Alexandria
and deal with any enemy resistance
encountered during the advance. Once the
campaign was underway, Steele would
move southeast from Little Rock.
The plan was flawed from the outset.
There was no actual unity of command.
Each of the three independent Union forces
could, in effect, operate autonomously as
the tactical situation unfolded. The com-
mands were also widely separated, withmore than 400 miles between the northern
and southern elements at the outset of the
campaign, making it difficult to maintain
reliable communications. Most disturbing
was the fact that Porter emphasized fire-
power and seemed to discount the deeper
draft of heavier warships. The shallow Red
River would prove to be a formidable
obstacle to riverine operations.
Nevertheless, on March 7 the vanguard
of the Union offensive, a cavalry division,
rode forward. Three days later, Smith’s vet-
erans left Vicksburg aboard transport ships
headed for the Red River. On March 12, a
powerful task force joined the mission fromPorter’s Upper Mississippi Fleet, including
the monitors Osageand Neosho,each
mounting big 11-inch guns; the armored
gunboats Carondelet, Essex,and Eastport;
and light tinclads Cricketand Fort Hind-
man.The heavy gunboat Lexingtonmade
an impressive sight while underway, and a
host of auxiliary and supply vessels, includ-
ing the hospital ship Woodford,rounded
out the largest concentration of naval
might thus far assembled in the western
theater of the war. Shortly after the war-
ships weighed anchor, Eastport ran
aground on a sandbar, an early harbinger
of troubles to come.ABOVE: Alert Union crewmen stand vigil atop their well-maintained gunboat on the Red River. BELOW: Union
ships docked at Alexandria while waiting for their infantry counterparts to arrive.CWQ-Sum16 Red River_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:20 PM Page 35