Mower as he moved toward Henderson’s
Hill, more than 20 miles northwest of
Alexandria. With a brigade of cavalry, an
artillery battery, and six regiments of
infantry, Mower struck the drowsing camp
of the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry, capturing
250 Confederate horsemen, many of their
mounts, and four artillery pieces. Taylor
was temporarily blinded by the loss of his
cavalry and forced to pull back another 40
miles up the Red River to Natchitoches.
Banks remained concerned about the
level of protection afforded by Porter’s big
guns and refused to move forward without
naval support, squandering an opportunity
for a more rapid overland advance. While
at Alexandria, Banks received an unwel-
come message from Grant specifying that
Smith’s troops were to be returned to Sher-
man by April 15 if it became apparent that
Shreveport would not fall before that date.
Realizing that time was becoming as much
of an enemy as the terrain or the Confed-
erates, Banks, Smith, and Porter set out
once more up the Red River.
Taylor abandoned Natchitoches as theFederals approached, and on April 3 Union
troops reached high ground at Grand
Ecore, 50 miles farther upriver. Smith’s
troops left their waterborne transportation,
and Banks found himself at a crossroads in
more ways than one. While Porter asserted
that a reconnaissance along the river, esti-
mated to take three days, was the best
course of action, Banks disagreed. He
argued that Shreveport could be reached
with four days of hard marching and that
Smith was scheduled to return to Sherman’s
command in less than two weeks.
Banks decided to send Porter upriver to
Springfield Landing, just below Shreveport,
along with 2,300 men to provide some
security against Confederates who were
sure to harass Porter’s boats from both
sides of the riverbank. Meanwhile, Banks
and Smith would march from Grand Ecore
toward their objective on the Shreveport-
Natchitoches Stagecoach Road. There were
no reliable maps of the area at hand, but
Banks accepted the risk of his troops
marching away from the Red River and the
protection of Porter’s guns.
Banks soon became painfully aware that
the Stagecoach Road was extremely nar-
row—in some areas little more than a dirt
path. The countryside was increasinglyinhospitable, with thickets and brambles
interrupted by ditches and ravines. One
Massachusetts cavalryman called it a
“howling wilderness.” Nevertheless, on
April 6 Banks set out, his men turning
away from the river. The column stretched
more than 20 miles with troops, horses,
artillery pieces, and roughly 1,000 wagons
streaming westward toward Los Adaes,
where Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee’s cavalry
screen, 4,000 inexperienced horsemen who
were recently converted from infantry,
turned north onto the Stagecoach Road.
Banks hoped to rendezvous with Porter at
Springfield Landing on Loggy Bayou on
April 10.
Compounding the problems of rough
terrain and poor roads, the Union force
marched in an ill-advised sequence. Behind
Lee’s cavalry came 300 heavily laden wag-
ons, at times slowing the pace to little more
than a crawl. Behind the wagons came
more than three divisions of foot soldiers,
then another 700 wagons. Smith’s troops,
the most experienced of the infantrymen,
brought up the rear of the column. When
Lee proposed that the infantry be allowed
to pass around the wagons where it might
support his cavalry, his request was denied.
Lee broke camp at Pleasant Hill on theMaj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks’s army crosses the Cane
River on March 31, 1864. The rugged bayous and alli-
gator-haunted swamplands were a “howling wilder-
ness,” said one Massachusetts cavalryman.CWQ-Sum16 Red River_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:20 PM Page 37