that persisted for almost three years.
McClellan made no secret of his profound
contempt for abolitionists, radical Repub-
licans, and newspapermen who began crit-
icizing his inactivity in the fall of 1861. Pri-
vately, he expressed his disdain for
Lincoln.
Most Northerners were unaware of the
growing distrust between the army com-
mander and the administration when
McClellan landed on the Peninsula and
began his advance in April 1862. His
amphibious turning movement gained him
the strategic initiative and an almost 4-to-
1 advantage over his foe at that point, yet
McClellan almost immediately ceased
offensive operations. Instead of smashing
through thinly manned Confederate
defenses at Yorktown, he instead con-
ducted a month-long siege of the city and
spent much of his time sending numerous
telegrams to the War Department, com-
plaining about his dire need for more men
and matériel, wet roads, and an enemy he
now numbered at 200,000 men.
Lee, meanwhile, was acting with his cus-
tomary dispatch, trading space for time,
improving Richmond’s defenses, concen-
trating his forces by recalling Maj. Gen.
Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and his men
back to Richmond from the Shenandoah
Valley, and sending Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stu-
art on a cavalry reconnaissance on June 12
to locate McClellan’s right flank. Stuart
found the enemy flank hanging in the air,
not anchored on any natural barriers such
as water or hills. Lee had earlier sent three
full brigades to beef up Jackson’s Valley
army for a possible new offensive toward
Washington, but when Jackson claimed he
would need even more men to mount such
an offensive and hold any captured ground,
Lee decided instead to bring the entire
24,000-man force back to Richmond.
After Seven Pines, McClellan sat pas-
sively on the outskirts of Richmond for
almost a month, but by mid-June he had
finally advanced his 94,000 effectives to
the city’s gates. Brig. Gen. Fitz John
Porter’s V Corps, 27,000 strong, was posi-
tioned north of the Chickahominy holding
high ground overlooking the small hamletof Mechanicsville, while those of Brig.
Gens. Samuel Heintzelman, Erasmus
Keyes, Edwin Sumner, and William
Franklin, numbering 67,000 men in all,
remained south of the river. Believing his
army outnumbered, McClellan’s objective
now was to advance just a bit farther
west, capture Old Tavern on the Nine
Mile Road, entrench, and begin a classic
siege. When Richmond fell, the war would
be won. McClellan’s intelligence chief,
Allan Pinkerton, was a competent railroad
detective but an abysmal intelligence offi-
cer; in June 1862 he estimated that the
Confederates in and around Richmond
numbered at least 180,000—and McClel-
lan believed him.
To get approval to carry out his bold but
risky counteroffensive, Lee convinced
Confederate President Jefferson Davis that
McClellan would use his vast force to fighta “war of outposts,” moving inexorably
from position to position while his big
siege guns pounded Richmond into rub-
ble. Lee outlined an intricate scheme that
would send three-quarters of his army,
under cover of darkness, north of the river,
leaving 23,000 defenders to repulse
McClellan’s main force south of the river
should he discover what Lee was up to and
mount an attack on the capital. Consider-
ing the direness of the situation—the gov-ernment was preparing to flee Richmond
if necessary—Lee believed the stakes were
high enough to warrant the gamble.
Central to Lee’s plan of operations was
maneuver; Jackson would furtively return
from the Valley (Lee sent orders for him to
do that on June 16) and advance south-
easterly around the reported enemy right
flank near the headwaters of Beaver Dam
Creek, his left protected by Stuart’s 2,000
troopers. Upon Jackson’s arrival in the
area, he would still be at least seven miles
from Lee’s main force. Therefore, early in
the morning on June 26, Brig. Gen.
Lawrence Branch’s brigade of Maj. Gen.
Ambrose Powell Hill’s division moved up
the Chickahominy to the river crossing at
Half Sink, where he would establish con-
tact with Jackson upon the latter’s arrival
at the Brook Turnpike. Then, after notify-
ing Hill of Jackson’s presence, Branchwould lead his brigade down the river on
a parallel route with Jackson’s men, brush-
ing aside any threat to Jackson’s right.
When Hill was certain that Branch and
Jackson were on the move, he would lead
his other five brigades, 11,000 strong,
across the Chickahominy at Meadow
Bridge, pivot, and drive eastward toward
Mechanicsville, two miles away.
After Hill’s troops moved through that
city, the Mechanicsville Bridge would beABOVE: Mechanicsville, Virginia, photographed in 1862, was a small hamlet on the high ground overlooking the
Chickahominy River. Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter’s 27,000-man V Corps was stationed there. OPPOSITE: A lone
Union sentry guards a temporary wooden bridge built by industrious engineers over the Chickahominy River.
Army tents are in the distance.CWQ-Sum16 Mechanicsville_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:15 PM Page 47