uncovered, allowing the divisions of Maj.
Gens. James Longstreet and Daniel Har-
vey Hill (who would be waiting with Lee
at the Mechanicsville Bridge just south of
the Chickahominy) to cross and fall in
behind the surging Confederate tide,
Longstreet backing up Jackson and D.H.
Hill supporting A.P. Hill. With vast enemy
columns advancing on his front, flank, and
rear, Porter would be forced to abandon
his position to avoid encirclement and
annihilation. Implicit in Lee’s scheme was
that no major confrontation take place
until Union forces east of Beaver Dam
Creek had been flushed from their posi-
tions. After the carnage at Seven Pines, Lee
wanted no more assaults against
entrenched enemy positions.
There were profound risks inherent in
Lee’s plan. To begin with, Porter’s V Corps
occupied a formidably strong defensive
position, one that Confederate engineers
had scouted weeks earlier and determined
to be almost impregnable. Beaver Dam
Creek, a tributary of the Chickahominy,
was a swampy body of water, waist deep
in places, running north-south through a
wide, deep ravine a mile east of Mechan-icsville. Both banks were covered by thick
underbrush and trees that Porter’s men had
fashioned into formidable abatis. On the
west side of the creek lay an open plain
swept by six Union batteries, 32 guns in
all, placed in earthen parapets so as to
bracket all potential approaches.
Along with the natural obstacles,
McClellan had massive reserves of men
available. Five regiments of riflemen of
Brig. Gen. John Reynolds’s brigade of Brig.
Gen. George McCall’s 8,000-man Penn-
sylvania Reserve Division were deployed
in a roughly north-south line astride Old
Church Road northeast of the village,
defending 60-foot-high slopes east of
Beaver Dam Creek. On their left, Brig.
Gen. Truman Seymour’s brigade was dug
in astride Cold Harbor Road, manning the
high ground north and south of Ellerson’s
Mill just north of Cold Harbor Road east
of the creek. The grist mill’s deep pond and
mill-race formed natural barriers to any
troops advancing on a west-to-east line.
Brig. Gen. George Meade’s brigade was
deployed in reserve to their rear. Porter’s
other two divisions, those of Brig. Gens.
George Morell and George Sykes, almost20,000 men, held an L-shaped line south
and east of McCall’s division.
By sending six of his 10 divisions north
of the Chickahominy, Lee would only have
the four small divisions of Maj. Gens. John
Magruder and Benjamin Huger left to
defend the city. Lee was risking every-
thing—his army, his capital, perhaps even
his country’s survival. By splitting his army
to gain an advantage at a critical point, he
was employing a classic Napoleonic tac-
tic. But Bonaparte himself might have
balked at attacking a heavily manned
defensive force astride a rain-choked river
backed by giant siege guns, less than seven
miles from his own country’s capital.
As usual, McClellan grossly underesti-
mated his opponent; he told Lincoln that
he actually preferred fighting Lee to Joseph
E. Johnston. “Lee is cautious and weak
under grave responsibility, wanting in
moral firmness when pressed by heavy
responsibilities,” McClellan asserted, “and
is likely to be timid and irresolute in
action.” Events would soon test the accu-
racy of his claims.
The success of Lee’s plan depended
entirely on Jackson’s timely arrival. After
his reinforced Valley army had begun the
100-mile trek to Richmond on June 18,
first by rail, then on foot, Jackson on the
night of the 22nd rode nonstop for 14
hours, arriving at the capital for an after-
noon conference the next day with Lee,
Longstreet, and the two Hills. Jackson’s
chief-of-staff, Major Robert Dabney, was
ordered to keep Jackson’s columns mov-
ing steadily forward in Jackson’s absence
but proved unequal to the task. Inaccurate
maps, straggling, muddy roads, and poor
staff work slowed the column’s progress.
After fighting six minor engagements and
marching more than 500 miles in less than
two months, the Valley veterans were
understandably fatigued.
When the meeting ended, Jackson imme-
diately rode back and rejoined his army,
which had reached Beaver Dam Station in
Hanover County, 30 miles from Beaver
Dam Creek. Upon arrival Jackson discov-
ered to his regret that only the vanguard of
his army was present; the rest was strungABOVE: Ever aggressive General Robert E. Lee divided his army at Mechanicsville, leaving only four of 10 divi-
sions to guard Richmond. It was a gamble even Napoleon might have thought twice about taking. OPPOSITE:
McClellan and his staff survey the fighting at Mechanicsville on June 26, 1862. In the distance is the turnpike
to Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy. It was the first of the Seven Days Battles.CWQ-Sum16 Mechanicsville_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:15 PM Page 48